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CONGRESSIONAL DEVOLUTION OF
IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING: A
SEPARATION OF POWERS CRITIQUE
ROGER C. HARTLEY*
I
INTRODUCTION

F

or roughly a decade, federal legislation has devolved to the states
some of Congress’s authority to adopt immigration policies that
discriminate against permanent resident aliens.1 Equal protection
challenges to discriminatory state policies so authorized by Congress
raise the knotty issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review.
Courts remain divided.2 The source of the difficulty is that the equal
protection “congruence principle” is not applicable to alienage
discrimination.3 Unlike equal protection cases throughout most of
constitutional law, the judiciary deploys different standards of
judicial review in alienage discrimination cases depending on
whether the discrimination arises under federal or state law.4
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1. See discussion infra notes 29–37 and accompanying text.
2. See cases cited infra note 41.
3. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (recognizing the
“congruence” principle as requiring that “‘[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
93 (1976))).
4. Equal protection challenges concerning discrimination against Native Americans are the
only other enduring example of deviation from the equal protection congruence principle. See
Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979) (concluding that “[i]t is settled
that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to
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Applying a highly deferential standard of review, courts normally
uphold congressionally enacted immigration policies discriminating
against aliens.5 By contrast, courts normally invoke strict judicial
scrutiny to find state alienage discrimination unlawful.6
Congressional devolution legislation authorizing states to adopt
policies that discriminate against aliens spawn equal protection
challenges that do not fit neatly into either category of judicial
review: the controversies entail state alienage discrimination but the
discrimination being challenged is congressionally authorized.
Devolution presents the question whether Congress should be able to
immunize the states from strict judicial scrutiny by authorizing the
states to adopt discriminatory immigration policies that Congress
could itself adopt. That question is the subject of this Article.
In this Article, I show that, to date, the devolution debate has
become mired, and is deadlocked, because it has failed to focus on
the separation of powers implications of congressional devolution. I
show that, properly understood, congressional devolution poses
complex issues regarding the respective authority of Congress and
the federal judiciary to superintend, and ultimately define, the
enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally
offensive [because] States do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians” (quoting
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974))). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), there was a six-year period when courts
applied disparate standards of judicial review to equal protection challenges of state and federal
affirmative action programs. See Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 561 n.344 (2001)
(discussing the disparate standards of review accorded affirmative action programs prior to the
Court’s decision in Adarand).
5. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976) (applying rational basis scrutiny to
federal alienage classification establishing discriminatory welfare eligibility policy). See discussion
infra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying strict judicial scrutiny
to, and holding unconstitutional, a state welfare eligibility policy establishing discriminatory
alienage classification because the discrimination did not advance a compelling state interest by
the least restrictive means practically available). See cases cited infra notes 7–11 and discussion in
accompanying text.
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Constitution’s equality norms.
These separation of powers
implications of congressional devolution are not likely to be
overlooked when the devolution issue eventually reaches the
Supreme Court.
My thesis is that addressing congressional
devolution as primarily a separation of powers problem holds the key
to resolving the proper scope of judicial review of congressionallyauthorized state alienage discrimination.
II
THE RATIONALE FOR ABANDONING THE
“CONGRUENCE PRINCIPLE” AND THE RESULTING STRATIFICATION OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ALIENAGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
The Supreme Court’s abandonment of the congruence principle
for cases involving alienage discrimination reflects the Court’s view
that the judiciary’s appropriate institutional role varies depending on
whether a case challenges state or federal alienage discrimination.
The reason state alienage classifications generally warrant strict
judicial scrutiny7 is that aliens are a paradigmatic example of a

7. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (holding that alienage classifications are “inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”). Strict judicial scrutiny has been used to review a
variety of state and local alienage classifications. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)
(holding it unconstitutional to limit financial aid for higher education to citizens and those aliens
who have declared an intent to become citizens); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
606 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a rule permitting only citizens to work in private
engineering practice).
Because “a democratic society is ruled by its people,” Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296
(1978), state and local governments need only demonstrate a rational basis to be permitted to
reserve certain government jobs for citizens, thereby excluding aliens for all consideration. See,
e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (holding that states may exclude aliens
from becoming probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72 (1979) (holding that
states may exclude aliens who have not declared their intent to become citizens from teaching in
public schools); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 293 (1978) (holding that police officers must be
citizens). But see Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (holding that barring aliens from
becoming notaries public is unconstitutional).
State discrimination against undocumented aliens has produced mixed results. The Court has
applied rational basis scrutiny to state discrimination against undocumented aliens. See DeCanas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (holding that a state is not precluded from banning employment
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“‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate.”8 The need for strict judicial scrutiny is
“premised on the Supreme Court’s view of the political process.”9
Suspect legislative classifications warrant heightened judicial
scrutiny, because these classifications so often reflect legislative
prejudice that it is unlikely that the legislative process will bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation.10 Accordingly, those harmed
by legislation creating suspect classifications “‘command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’”11
Federal laws discriminating against aliens are measured
differently. The Court has never stated that federal law poses a lower
risk than does state law of manifesting legislative prejudice, though
this likely is the case.12 Rather, the rationale is that “the responsibility
of undocumented aliens if that employment would adversely affect resident workers where such
legislation is justified as an “attempt[] to protect [the state’s] fiscal interests and lawfully resident
labor force from the deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal
aliens . . . and is tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils”). But a state is denied rational
basis review when, for example, it denies a free public education to undocumented school-age
children. Here, the Court deploys intermediate scrutiny to measure constitutionality. See Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (explaining that the state has the burden of demonstrating
that the classification is rationally related to a substantial state interest); see also id. at 238 (Powell,
J., concurring) (acknowledging the Court’s use of a “heightened” standard of review and citing
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court’s then relatively recent case that employed an
intermediate standard of judicial review for gender cases.)
8. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (1971). The inability of aliens to vote contributes to their
“political powerlessness,” which is a “traditional indicia of suspectness.” San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978)
(recognizing that aliens’ inability to “have [a] direct voice in the political process[]” is a factor
supporting heightened judicial scrutiny of alienage classifications).
9. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1095 (N.Y. 2001). See also United States v. Carolene
Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (observing that “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”).
10. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–42 (1985).
11. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
12. See discussion supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (stating that strict judicial
scrutiny is a reaction to the concern that state alienage discrimination may reflect legislation
prejudice).
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for regulating the relationship between the United States and our
alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government.”13 The Court accepts that “there may be
overriding national interests which justify selective federal [alienage
discrimination] that would be unacceptable for an individual State.”14
Applying these precepts in Mathews v. Diaz,15 the Court there upheld
the constitutionality of a federal statute denying eligibility of certain
lawful resident aliens for enrollment in the Medicare supplemental
insurance program.16 The federal statute was constitutional, the
Court reasoned, because exclusion was not “wholly irrational” and
served a “legitimate” fiscal interest.17 The judiciary’s virtual
abandonment of review of federal alienage discrimination reflects its
conclusion that decisions made by the Congress or the President in
the area of immigration and foreign affairs are in the nature of a
political question that leaves little room for judicial oversight.18

13. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
14. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (recognizing the “paramount
federal power over immigration and naturalization” as a significant restraint on judicial oversight
of federal discrimination against aliens).
15. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
16. Id. at 87 (upholding the constitutionality of a Social Security Act provision denying
eligibility for enrollment in the Medicare part B supplemental insurance program to all aliens
except those who have been admitted for permanent residence and have resided in the United
States for at least five years).
17. See id. at 83–85. The Court accepted for sake of argument that the requirement of
residence in the United States for five years before a resident alien becomes eligible for Medicaid
was “longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the [Medicaid] program.” Id. at 83.
That was not fatal to the federal legislation, however, because some durational period is
appropriate, and it is up to Congress, not the judiciary, to draw the line because of the “exclusive
federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens.” Id. at 83–84.
18. See id. at 81–82. (concluding that “such decisions are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary . . . . The reasons that
preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions
made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” (emphasis
added)).
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Diaz was decided June 1, 1976. Justice Stevens drafted the
majority opinion. That same day, the Court decided Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong,19 in another majority opinion written by Justice
Stevens. In contradistinction to the near total absence of substantive
oversight expressed in Diaz, the Court in Wong imposed on federal
alienage discrimination a rigorous procedural precondition. The
Court held in Wong that judicial deference to discriminatory federal
immigration policy generally is warranted only if the decision to
discriminate was “expressly mandated by the Congress or the
President.”20 If a rule that discriminates against aliens is made by
others, the Court will defer to the political judgment that the rule is
needed to advance overriding national interests only when the entity
making that judgment “has direct responsibility for fostering or
protecting” the asserted overriding federal interests.21
The procedural preconditions detailed in Wong arise from the
Court’s understanding of the requirements of the Due Process Clause
in the Fifth Amendment.22 Due process, the Court held, requires that
before a court may defer to the political judgments of the national
government, it must have a “legitimate basis” for concluding two
things: that “the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the
rule” and that the asserted justifying interest is an “overriding”
federal interest.23 That “legitimate basis” does not arise from the

19. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
20. Id. at 103.
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
23. Wong, 426 U.S. at 103.
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political judgments of just “any agent of the National Government.”24
An “express[] mandate[] by the Congress or the President”25
adopting a discriminatory immigration rule would be sufficient to
provide the Court the requisite “legitimate basis” due process
requires. The judiciary then comfortably could presume, without
further inquiry, that the discrimination is justified by overriding
federal interests. When neither the Congress nor the President
“expressly mandate[]” a discriminatory rule, however, the Court is
far more circumspect. Then, as noted above, the Court will find a
“legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to
serve [an overriding federal] interest”26 only when the discriminatory
rule is promulgated by a congressional or presidential designee that
“has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting” the asserted
justifying federal interests.27

24. Id. at 101 (concluding that “the federal power over aliens is [not] so plenary that any
agent of the National Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different
substantive rules from those applied to citizens”).
25. Id. at 103.
26. Id.
27. Id. Wong accommodated a tension that has existed in immigration law for over a
century and relied on established distinctions for doing so. In the 1889 case Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, the Court upheld federal legislation
to exclude Chinese laborers from immigrating to the United States, reasoning that exclusion of
aliens is a plenary power inherent in sovereignty. The Court extended this reasoning to expulsion
of aliens in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893), explaining that the power to
expel, like the power to exclude, is also a plenary power inherent in sovereignty and, since it is a
power that affects foreign relations, is vested in the political departments of the government. In
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896), however, the Court held that there are
constitutional limits on the federal government’s exercise of its immigration power. There,
federal law provided for executive officers, not Article III judges, to impose imprisonment at hard
labor prior to deportation for Chinese aliens found to be illegally residing in the United States.
The Court held that “[i]t is not consistent with the theory of our government that the legislature
should, after having defined an offence as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt, and adjudge
the punishment by one of its own agents.” Id. Wong Wing acknowledged a tension between the
federal government’s plenary immigration power and the judiciary’s role in protecting individual
rights and accommodated the competing legitimate interests by not questioning the substance of
immigration law but insisting on certain procedural regularities in its execution. Accord Yamataya
v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (concluding that courts will not
scrutinize the substance of deportation rule but will be available to review that deportation
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In short, Wong holds that the judiciary’s willingness to accord
Diaz-type deference varies depending on the institutional capacity of
the decision maker that is the source of a challenged rule.28 I shall
refer to this holding as Wong’s differential-deference principle.
III
DEVOLUTION OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND ITS SEPARATION OF POWERS IMPLICATIONS
So things remained until 1996 when Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA).29 PRWORA greatly revamped federal welfare and
immigration policy. In the process, PRWORA added a layer of
uncertainty regarding the judiciary’s proper role in adjudicating
equal protection challenges to state policies discriminating against
aliens.
Title IV of PRWORA, as modified several times after 1996,
provides that aliens, who arrive in the United States after August 22,
1996, and currently are admitted for permanent residence under the
Immigration and Nationality Act30 (legal immigrants), are entirely
ineligible for some federally financed “means-tested public benefits”
and are ineligible for others for five years.31 PRWORA also
complies with procedural due process). Hampton v. Wong continued the distinction between
substantive and procedural review, but the procedure it examined was that used to promulgate
the challenged rule rather than that used to administer it.
28. In Wong, the federal Civil Service Commission had promulgated a rule limiting most
federal employment to United States citizens. The Court was unwilling to conclude that the rule
was promulgated to advance overriding federal interests because the rule was not promulgated by
either the President or the Congress, and the Civil Service Commission was not directly
responsible for fostering or promulgating immigration or foreign relations policy. Id. at 104–16.
29. Pub. L. No. 104-193 §§ 400–51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–77 (codified in scattered sections of
8, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PRWORA].
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq.
31. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(2)–(3), 1613 (ineligibility for SSI and five-year bar for other
“means-tested public benefits” including Medicaid and TANF); id. § 1612(a)(2) (five-year
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authorizes states to maintain a portion of the ineligibility for
federally-financed programs beyond the initial five-year bar.32 In
addition, with some minor exceptions, “a State is authorized to
determine the eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who
is a [legal immigrant].”33 This last provision means states possess
federally authorized discretion to exclude most legal immigrants
from state-funded public benefits, as many states have done, even
though the states provide those benefits for its own citizens.34
Congress acquiesces in the states’ exercise of the discretion
PRWORA grants in order to promote immigrant self-sufficiency—a
“basic principle of United States immigration law” and to discourage
immigration to the United States that is motivated by the
immigrant’s desire to obtain public benefits.35 Congress declared in
PRWORA that meeting these goals is a “compelling government
interest.”36 Moreover, PRWORA provides that a state choosing “to
follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of
[immigrant] aliens shall be considered to have chosen the least
restrictive means available for achieving the compelling government

ineligibility for Food Stamps for most legal immigrants); id. §1632(a) (state discretion to “deem[]”
income of immigrant’s sponsors as income of immigrant in calculating eligibility for public
benefits). For a detailed description of the PRWORA’s complex eligibility rules for aliens, see
Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review, in IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE
REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF POLICY (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana Aparicio eds., 2004), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/publications/200405_singer.htm.
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (giving states the option to extend ineligibility beyond five
years for Medicaid and TANF).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (permitting states unlimited authority to set eligibility standards for
state public benefits programs for most legal immigrants).
34. See Wendy Zimmerman & Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for
Immigrants Under Welfare Reform, 24 THE URBAN INSTITUTE 1, 30 and Table 4 (1999), available
at http://www.urban.org/publications/309007.html (providing state-by-state breakdown of states’
response to PRWORA’s authorization to discriminate against lawful immigrants).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1).
36. Id. § 1601(5)–(6).
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interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with
national immigration policy.”37
The intended legal effect of PRWORA’s devolution provisions is
to render lawful some state welfare-eligibility policies that the
judiciary otherwise would hold are unconstitutional.38 PRWORA
might achieve this goal through either of two strategies. First, as
summarized above, PRWORA declares that the requirements of
strict judicial scrutiny are satisfied when states discriminate in ways
that PRWORA condones.39 In the alternative, PRWORA introduces
the possibility that when states engage in PRWORA-authorized
alienage discrimination, PRWORA transfers to the states the
deferential rational basis standard of judicial review Diaz accords the
federal government’s own alienage classifications.40 These strategies
present the question of whether, by legislatively expressing its
approval, Congress should be able to authorize state policy choices
that in the absence of congressional consent would run afoul of the
Constitution when Congress is constitutionally permitted to adopt
directly the same policies itself. For ease of reference, let us call this
the “devolution issue.” After more than ten years since PRWORA’s

37. Id. § 1601(7).
38. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding in two consolidated cases
that it is it is a violation of equal protection to make non-citizens ineligible for public assistance or
to condition receipt of benefits to aliens’ residence in state for at least 15 years).
39. See discussion supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
40. The lower courts have consistently upheld federal statutes prohibiting states from
providing certain federally-financed welfare benefits to legal aliens. See, e.g., Lewis v. Thompson,
252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding under rational basis review PRWORA restrictions on
alien eligibility for state-administered pre-natal Medicaid benefits); City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189
F.3d 598, 603–05 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding similar restrictions on supplemental security income
(SSI) and food stamps under rational basis review); Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2000) (using rational basis review to uphold restrictions on food stamps); Rodriguez v.
United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1346–50 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying rational basis reviews to uphold
SSI and food stamps restrictions). The devolution issue is different since it arises when Congress
has not expressly mandated any state action but rather provides the states discretion to choose
whether to enact discriminatory policies.
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enactment, the lower courts remain divided over the proper
resolution of the devolution issue.41 The Supreme Court has not yet
considered the question.42
It is useful in pondering the devolution issue to appreciate that if
Congress possesses the legislative power to inoculate the states with
its own protection from strict judicial scrutiny, Congress also
41. Compare Erlich v. Perez, 2006 WL 2882834, at *18 (Md. 2006) (holding that
constitutional challenge to PRWORA-authorized state policy to deny benefits to lawful
permanent resident aliens likely to succeed on the merits), and Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d
1085, 1096 (N.Y. 2001) (holding unconstitutional termination of non-emergency, state-funded
medical benefits for legal immigrants who were ineligible for federal benefits despite explicit
authorization in federal law giving states complete discretion to determine eligibility for any state
public benefit of a legal immigrant who has resided in the United States for less than five years),
with Soskin v. Reinerston, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “[o]nce Congress
has expressed [a] policy [to give states the discretion to deny state-funded welfare benefits to
certain legal immigrants], the courts must be deferential [recognizing] that a state’s exercise of
discretion can also effectuate national policy”).
42. The Court has decided a related issue PRWORA created. PRWORA added a provision
to federal welfare policy also entailing federal devolution of welfare eligibility policy, but not
welfare policy directed at aliens. PRWORA authorized any state receiving block grants under the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) federal welfare program to apply the state’s
own benefit amounts to a family seeking TANF benefits. However, if the benefit amounts of the
TANF program of another state from which the family has moved are lower, the current state, the
one from which the family currently is seeking TANF benefits, may apply those lower amounts if
the family has resided in the current state for less than 12 months. 110 Stat. 2124, 42 U.S.C. §
604(c). The Supreme Court ruled this 12-month waiting period unconstitutional in Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999). The 12-month waiting period authorized by TANF violates the right to
travel enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 498–
507. Most important for the present discussion, the Court in Saenz held that congressional
approval of the durational residency requirement does not “resuscitate[] the constitutionality” of
the waiting period. Id. at 507. The Court reasoned that “the protection afforded to the citizen by
the Citizenship Clause of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is a limitation on the powers of the
National Government as well as the States.” Id. at 507–08. The Court also reasoned, “we have
consistently held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 507 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (“‘Congress is
without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which
authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause’”) (citing Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282, 291 (1971))). See also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732–33 (1982)
(holding the Congressional Section 5 power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not empower Congress to “validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Saenz left the “devolution issue” unresolved since it was not necessary for the Court to decide
whether the outcome would be different if the state discriminatory policy federal law authorizes
states to adopt were, unlike the situation in Saenz, a policy that Congress could constitutionally
adopt directly.
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possesses, in effect, the authority to act as the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of state alienage discrimination.43 One should not
be misled that this gatekeeper function can be easily cabined. If
federal regulation of immigration and foreign affairs is a political
question that leaves little room for judicial oversight, as the Court has
stated,44 Congress itself may presumably legislate alienage
classifications affecting its entire plenary authority to regulate
immigration and naturalization.45 Congress could itself, for example,
1) bar states from granting financial aid for higher education for
aliens; 2) require states to make free public education available only
to citizens; 3) deny aliens a license to fish in coastal waters; 4) render
aliens ineligible for any state or local civil service job;46 5) permit only
citizens to be licensed to engage in the private practice of
engineering; or even 6) exclude aliens from being licensed as
attorneys. Moreover, if PRWORA’s strategy is successful, and courts

43. This is because either Congress possesses the authority to declare that the requirements
of strict judicial scrutiny are satisfied when states discriminate in ways federal law permits or that
such state legislation is to be evaluated using the deferential rational basis review. See discussion
supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
44. See discussion supra note 13–18 and accompanying text.
45. Three months after the Court's decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100
(1976), President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order establishing an alienage classification
substantially similar to that struck down in Wong. See generally Exec. Order No. 11935, 3 C.F.R. §
146 (1976), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976). Its constitutionality has been upheld
based on the overriding federal interest of providing an incentive for citizenship. See Mow Sun
Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744–45 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lum v. Campbell,
450 U.S. 959 (1981). Accord Jalil v Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120, 1123 n.3 (1978); Vergara v.
Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979); Santin Ramos v.
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 430 F. Supp 422, 425 (P.R. 1977). This is not to say that Congress could
constitutionally enact legislation that discriminates against aliens if motivated by antipathy or
prejudice. See Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that equal protection
means “that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest”). Accord Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (concluding that equal protection is violated when
legislation is motivated by “irrational prejudice”).
46. Or at least Congress could make accepting such a civil service position a basis for
deportation.
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uphold the constitutionality of the PRWORA-authorized state
discrimination against aliens, Congress’s ability to immunize states
from constitutional attack would transcend immigration policy
related to welfare eligibility. Indeed, there is every reason to believe
that the congressional power to consent to state discrimination could
be applied to any or all of the federal discriminatory immigration
policy choices listed above. Yet such unbridled devolution would give
Congress the power to reverse almost sixty years of Supreme Court
precedent holding state and local alienage discrimination
unconstitutional. The precedent is clear because over that period the
Court has held that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause47
for the states to 1) prohibit state financial aid for higher education for
aliens;48 2) deny free public education to aliens—even undocumented
aliens;49 3) deny aliens a license to fish in coastal waters;50 4) render
aliens ineligible for any state or local civil service job;51 5) permit only
citizens to be licensed to practice engineering;52 or 6) exclude aliens
from being licensed as attorneys.53
In short, devolution surely poses important individual rights and
federalism issues. But the devolution issue also raises equally
important separation of powers questions involving the Congress’s
authority to manipulate the scope of judicial scrutiny deployed to
evaluate equal protection challenges to state alienage discrimination.

47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
48. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
49. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
50. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
51. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
52. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976). See also Ariz. State Liquor
Bd. v. Ali, 550 P.2d 663, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding it unconstitutional to exclude all aliens
from eligibility to obtain spirituous liquor license).
53. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1973).
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It would be foolish to discount the separation of powers
implications of the devolution issue simply because current federal
legislation has exported to the States little of the federal government’s
authority to discriminate against aliens.54 Signs of a national nativist
backlash abound. For example, “Nuestro Himno,” the Spanishlanguage adaptation of the National Anthem, “has been greeted with
an unprecedented and, indeed, astonishing wave of denunciations all
over the United States.”55 With this reaction comes increased
concern over immigration, seen in events such as “vigilante
Minutemen [volunteering to defend our borders] . . . , more calls for
deporting all illegal workers, more demands that an impenetrable
wall be built [to quell illegal immigration, and] more attempts to
dismantle bilingual education in U.S. schools.”56 Congress can, and
has, become aroused over the foreign influences that have insinuated
themselves into modern American life, as evidenced by the calls from
both conservative and liberal members of the Supreme Court for
Congress to cease its efforts to enact legislation that would prevent

54. Federal devolution raising the issues addressed in this Article is currently limited to
eligibility for government-funded benefits. See discussion supra notes 30–40 and accompanying
text.
55. Ariel Dorfman, Waving the Star-Spanglish Banner, WASH. POST, May 9, 2006, at B2,
available at 2006 WLNR 7938063.
56. Id. Even ordering a Philly cheesesteak sandwich can become problematic for those
unable to order in English since one legendary outlet for such a delicacy is reported to have placed
a sign in the order window that instructs customers, “‘This is America: When Ordering Speak
English.’” Wit Cheese, Not Con Queso, WASH. POST, June 18, 2006, at A2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700753.html?
nav=rss_print/asection (including a photograph of the order window and showing below it
another sign stating “Management Reserves The Right To Refuse Service” and reporting the
proprietor’s view that decreeing English-only at the ordering window will teach immigrants to
“know how lucky they are [to live in America]”); id. (reporting also that at this English-only
establishment, obtaining onions on the sandwich is accomplished efficiently—just by saying
“wit”). In addition, citizen initiatives have placed many proposals that all municipal business be
conducted in English on local ballots. See, e.g., Ashley Powers, Proposal on Migrant Issues Will Go
to Voters, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8382696.
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the Supreme Court from using foreign law in its constitutional
rulings.57
Despite all of this, it remains true that there has been no
wholesale congressional delegation to the States of the federal
authority to adopt discriminatory policies affecting aliens. One
would be naive, however, to conclude that Congress will not be
pressed vigorously to enact legislation that authorizes the states to
discriminate against aliens—especially if the Supreme Court were to
uphold PRWORA’s devolution provisions.58 One need only consider
the lingering dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision in In re
Griffiths,59 which held that states may not limit the practice of law to
United States citizens. States still discriminate against aliens with
respect to admission to legal practice, more so today than just a few
years ago.60 This discrimination has been upheld by giving Griffiths a
restrictive interpretation.61 The opposition to the holding in Griffiths
has been intense. In 1979, for example, in Wyoming v. State Board of
57. See Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind Its Own Business, WASH. POST, May 19,
2006, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/18/
AR2006051801961_pf.html.
58. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration and Federalism, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
283, 285 (2002) (arguing that “the overall public support for devolution is unlikely to evaporate”).
59. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
60. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently changed its definition of “resident
alien” so as to deny eligibility to practice law to all aliens except those “who have attained
permanent resident status in the United States.” In re Bourke, 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (La. 2002)
(expressly overruling In re Appert, 444 So. 2d 1208, 1208 (La. 1984), which had defined “resident
alien” to include any “foreign national[] lawfully within the United States”).
61. Louisiana’s current restriction of aliens’ eligibility to practice law (see discussion supra
note 60) has been upheld by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th
Cir. 2005). That court reasoned that Griffiths (and indeed all of the Supreme Court’s cases
applying strict judicial scrutiny to state and local alienage discrimination) requires the application
of strict scrutiny only with respect to discrimination against legal immigrant aliens—those who
have achieved legal residency status in the United States. Id. at 419 (“[W]e conclude that although
aliens are a suspect class in general, they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support
the proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class entitled to have state legislative
classifications concerning them subjected to strict scrutiny.”). Discrimination against legal
nonimmigrant aliens receives a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny. Id. at 419–20.
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Law Examiners,62 the Wyoming Supreme Court reluctantly declared
unconstitutional a Wyoming statute excluding all but United States
citizens from the practice of law, concluding that it must do so
because Griffiths “represents the ‘supreme law of the land’ which we
must follow.”63 Then-Chief Justice Raper, concurring, expressed his
view that the Wyoming legislature should not strike from the state’s
statutes the requirement of United States citizenship to practice law.
He argued that maintaining the provision would be a symbolic
expression of loyalty64 and expressed his fervent hope that “some day
[the statute’s] requirement may have its full and intended viability
restored. United States citizenship is of greater value than Griffiths
and our decision here assigns it . . . . United States citizenship should
not be eroded in any fashion by even a hint of insignificance. The
creeping, insidious deterioration of basic values is foreboding.”65
It is likely, certainly plausible, that states increasingly will insist
that Congress exercise a “consent power”66 to enact additional
immigration legislation that authorizes the states to exercise the
federal government’s power to discriminate against aliens.67 If such
insistence results in congressional devolution in broad areas of
immigration policy, states may assert in litigation that

62. 601 P.2d 174 (Wyo. 1979).
63. Id. at 176.
64. Id. at 176 (Raper, C.J., concurring) (“[Maintaining the statutory provision] has symbolic
value as well as a real significance as an expression of our loyalty and recognition as a State of the
importance of United State citizenship and the ideals of a free people, which attorneys and
counselors are especially sworn to uphold.”).
65. Id.
66. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to
an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 393 (1983) (naming Congress’s devolution authority the
“consent power”).
67. See Wishnie, supra note 4, at 497–98 (concluding that “there will come a time when state
budgets are not so flush, and when episodic American nativism returns. Then, more states will try
to balance their budgets on the backs of indigent immigrants”).
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congressionally authorized alienage discrimination is immune from
heightened judicial scrutiny. Should these arguments prevail,
Congress in effect will have commandeered much of the judiciary’s
“province and duty . . . to say what the law is.”68 Accordingly, the
devolution debate ought to focus on the separation of powers
implications of devolution. It has not yet done so, as I show next.
IV
NEGLECTING SEPARATION OF POWERS
ISSUES IN THE CURRENT DEVOLUTION DEBATE
Immediately following the Court’s decision in Diaz, academic
literature strongly criticized the rule handed down, urging either its
reversal or limitation. Michael Perry advocated a complete reversal,
arguing that “[i]f it is unjust for a state to treat a person as inferior on
the basis of a morally irrelevant trait, there is no conceivable basis for
concluding that it is any less unjust for the federal government to do
the same.”69 Gerald Rosberg argued that, at least with respect to
welfare policy and federal employment, there needed to be a return
to strict judicial scrutiny of federal alienage classifications because
“deference to the political branches on immigration matters [does]
not seem to have any force [since] the Court can scrutinize the
legislation without fear of enmeshing itself in the complex process of
formulating immigration policy.”70

68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 703 (1974) (affirming Chief Justice Marshall’s claim in Marbury). The Courts have forcefully
asserted the federal judiciary’s role as ultimate constitutional arbiter. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1958) (dictum) (quoting from and expounding upon Marbury); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (stating the Court is “to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution”).
69. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1062 (1979).
70. Gerald D. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 328 (1978).
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In 1983, William Cohen wrote an important article that
anticipated the current devolution debate.71 Identifying examples of
permissible delegation of congressional power to the states with
respect to Congress’s power to tax and regulate interstate commerce,
Cohen argued for the general principle that
Congress should be able to remove constitutional limits on state
power if those limits stem solely from divisions of power within
the federal system. In other words, Congress should be able to
approve unconstitutional policy choices in state laws when
Congress is not constitutionally prohibited from directly
adopting the same policy itself.72

Cohen named this the “congressional consent power.”73 He
obliquely acknowledged a possible separation of powers quagmire
lurking in this “consent power” when he acknowledged, “[m]y thesis
may appear to allow Congress to amend the Constitution and to
deny the Supreme Court’s role as ultimate interpreter of
constitutional provisions.”74 But Cohen was dismissive of these
concerns, concluding that “these theoretical objections stem largely
from abstract, nineteenth century notions of sovereignty that fail to
provide useful guidance to practical problems of federalism.”75
Gilbert Carrasco also anticipated the devolution issue in 1994,
two years before the enactment of PRWORA.76 Carrasco argued that
“[i]t is a fundamental precept of constitutional law that Congress

71. Cohen, supra note 66.
72. Id. at 388. Cohen further argued that “[i]n appropriate circumstances, Congress should
be able to authorize the states to enact legislation that, in the absence of congressional consent,
would run afoul of the . . . equal protection clause[].” Id.
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id.
76. Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the
Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591 (1994).
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may not authorize states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
whether through its Section Five power77 or based on some other
source of constitutional authority.”78 Carrasco added an argument
that has become a mainstay within the devolution debate—that the
Congress’s power “to establish an [sic] uniform rule for
naturalization”79 precludes congressional delegation of discretion to
the states to frame immigration policy because, by definition, United
States immigration policy would then no longer be “uniform.”80
Following the 1996 enactment of PRWORA came a flurry of
articles, all published in 1997. Most renewed the attack on Diaz. The
student work primarily advanced the views of either Perry,81 or
Rosberg,82 or of both.83 Victor Romero chose a different tack, urging

77. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
78. Carrasco, supra note 76, at 623. In support of his argument that Congress lacks authority
to diminish the scope of constitutional rights through its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
power, Carrasco relied on the so-called “ratchet theory,” expressed in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (stating that “[w]e emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power
to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees”).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
80. Carrasco, supra note 76, at 631–38. It was necessary for Carrasco to distinguish federal
authority to regulate immigration from other federal powers because, as he points out, it is well
established that “Congress has some ability to delegate its law-making” to administrative agencies,
to the executive branch, to private parties, and to states and state officials. Id. at 626. Carrasco
argues that accepting his thesis will have the salutary effect of “forc[ing] . . . . Congress to make
the most difficult policy choices.” Id. at 628.
81. See Valerie L. Barth, Comment, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the Judiciary: A
Proposal for Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 105, 147–
48 (1997) (urging a return to strict judicial scrutiny of federal alienage classifications “[i]n light of
the similarities between legal immigrants and citizens . . . notwithstanding the federal
government's plenary power”).
82. Connie Chang, Comment, Immigrants Under the New Welfare Law: A Call for
Uniformity, a Call for Justice, 45 UCLA L. REV. 205, 249–52, 262, 269–72 (1997) (summarizing
and urging adoption of Rosberg’s reasoning). See also Recent Legislation, Welfare Reform—
Treatment of Legal Immigrants—Congress Authorizes States to Deny Public Benefits to Noncitizens
and Excludes Legal Immigrants from Federal Aid Programs—Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1997) (advancing the view
that Congress should be constitutionally barred from discrimination against aliens with respect to
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a reexamination of Diaz in light of post-Diaz judicial developments.84
One 1997 article, by Peter Spiro, strongly supported congressional
devolution power, but less on legal than on policy grounds.85 Spiro
argued that, with devolution, immigration policy “will more
efficiently represent wide state-to-state variations in voter
preferences and that may ultimately benefit aliens as a group.”86 He
gave two reasons for this beneficial effect. First, devolution has the
“steam-valve” virtues of federalism, in that it diminishes insistence
that Congress adopt nationwide discriminatory policies.87 Second,
devolution will not have a “race-to-the-bottom” effect.88 Spiro
acknowledged the competing legal arguments that had been raised
regarding the constitutionality of devolution but urged his readers to
focus on the reality that “[t]he merits of these novel arguments aside,
one might only note . . . that were Congress barred from delegation,

eligibility for benefits because such laws do not warrant the extreme judicial deference given to
laws principally relating to immigration policy).
83. Recent Legislation, supra note 82, at 1194–95 (attacking Diaz based on the arguments of
both Rosberg and Perry).
84. Victor Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionality of the
Hostage Taking Act, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 573, 574–75, 599–605 (1997) (urging reconsideration of
Diaz in light of the congruence principle reaffirmed in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) and the application of “heightened scrutiny” in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
85. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1627, 1627 (1997).
86. Id.
87. Id. (explaining that “state-level authority will allow those states harboring intense antialien sentiment to act on those sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest on their
part to seek national legislation to [achieve] similarly restrictionist ends. [Thus] one state's
preferences, frustrated at home, are not visited on the rest of us by way of Washington”).
88. Id. at 1627–28. (arguing that “[u]nder a model of competitive federalism, states will be
forced to weigh the assumed savings of anti-alien measures against the costs associated with
interstate and international opprobrium provoked by such discrimination. . . . Some states will
still discriminate against aliens; persistent state-to-state variations will more efficiently allocate the
burdens of immigration among the states as aliens themselves respond to such variations by
moving to more hospitable jurisdictions. But the balance likely precludes a scenario in which all
states maximally discriminate within the constraints of federal law”).
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it would in most cases opt for uniformity by canceling, not
extending, benefits across the board.”89
The devolution debate became even more elevated, and
eloquently argued, with the publication of Michael Wishnie’s
ground-breaking 2001 article, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of
the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism.90 It crafted
the fiercest post-PRWORA attack on devolution up to that time and
within a year generated an equally well-argued, and withering,
rebuttal.91 Wishnie expanded on Carrasco’s argument that the power
to set immigration policy is exclusively federal and cannot be
delegated to the states. Wishnie did not rely on the literal text of the
Naturalization Clause, as did Carrasco. Rather, he argued the
broader proposition that Congress lacks constitutional authority to
grant states the discretion to decide whether aliens should have
access to public benefits because this constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation to the states of the power to set immigration policy. His
claim was that “the federal power to regulate immigration, a power
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but universally
recognized for over a century, is among those that are exclusively
national and incapable of devolution to the states.”92 The argument
began with a demonstration that the Supreme Court consistently has
located the Congress’s non-textual authority to regulate immigration
in the inherent sovereignty of the United States.93 Accordingly,

89. Id. at 1629 n.41.
90. See Wishnie, supra note 4.
91. See infra notes 97–113 and accompanying text (discussing Howard F. Chang, Public
Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 357 (2002)).
92. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 494.
93. Id. at 550 (“Given the consistent reference in the foreign affairs cases to immigration
cases citing inherent sovereignty, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would apply its broader
analysis of inherent sovereignty to the specific context of immigration.”).
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Wishnie argued, since “powers incident to the nation’s sovereignty
are exclusively federal powers[, i]t would seem to follow that only the
sovereign can exercise sovereign powers, for transfer or devolution of
such powers is a surrender of sovereignty itself.”94 To this, Wishnie
added two supporting policy rationales. The first was what might be
called the equality argument: devolution should be rejected to
preserve the vitality of the Constitution’s equality values.
“[D]evolution would erode the antidiscrimination and anticaste
principles that are at the heart of our Constitution and that long have
protected noncitizens at the subfederal level.”95 The second was the
“possibility of a race-to-the-bottom among the States.”96
The following year, Howard Chang mounted a vigorous counterargument to what he called the “nondevolvability principle”
championed by Wishnie and Carrasco.97 Chang began by stating that
it begs the question to claim that the devolution issue amounts to
nothing more than the question of whether Congress has the power
to authorize the States to violate the Constitution. Why, he asked,
“should we think that the states are still violating the Equal

94. Id. at 552.
95. Id. at 553. Wishnie further explained this:
The plenary power doctrine of immigration law inevitably shields governmental action
from the level of judicial scrutiny that ordinarily would be applied, distorting
constitutional jurisprudence and countenancing what otherwise would be invalidated as
arbitrary or discriminatory government behavior. Permitting devolution would amplify
this distortion, privileging the plenary power doctrine over equal protection norms at
the state and local level. Given the choice, one should reject a constitutional theory that
endorses the creation of state and local laboratories of bigotry against immigrants. If
devolution were permissible, the corrosive effects of the plenary power doctrine on
equality norms would not necessarily be limited to the realm of welfare rules.
Id.
96. Id. at 554.
97. Chang, supra note 91, at 358.
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Protection clause when they act with federal authorization?”98 Chang
is correct to the extent he argues that the issue devolution raises is
whether federal authorization for states to discriminate, granted in
the exercise of Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration and
other aspects of foreign affairs, should affect the degree of scrutiny
that courts apply when states adopt congressionally-authorized
discriminatory policies burdening aliens.99 Whatever the answer,
that question is quite distinct from, and more nuanced than, an
inquiry as to whether Congress may authorize the States to violate
the Constitution.
Having cleared the brush and clarified the issue, Chang
challenged directly one of the most facially appealing arguments
advanced by critics of devolution,100 that devolution is
unconstitutional because it results in “divergent state policies”
contrary to the uniformity limitations found in the Constitution’s
Naturalization Clause.101 To this, Chang argued first that the federal

98. Id. Chang pointed out that, throughout constitutional law, Congress permissibly
“authorize[s] state laws that would be unconstitutional in the absence of such authorization,”
citing the congressional power to authorize States to enact laws that without such authorization
would violate the Commerce Clause, the federal government’s foreign affairs power and power to
regulate foreign commerce, and the power to regulate the affairs of Native Americans. Id. at 359
n.13. Wishnie had also addressed and distinguished this precedent. See Wishnie, supra note 4, at
539–41, 546–47, 561.
99. Chang, supra note 91, at 367. Chang answered this question by stating, “[g]iven the
degree of judicial deference accorded to the decisions made by the political branches of the federal
government on these matters, it seems logical that authorization by these branches should imply
similar deference for state laws enacted with prior federal approval.” Id. For the argument in this
Article that existing Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that deference to federal “approval”
of state discretion to discriminate is not a “logical” extension of the deference given to federal
“decisions” to discriminate, see discussion infra notes 155–181 and accompanying text.
100. See Carrasco, supra note 76, at 631–38; Wishnie, supra note 4, at 566.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to enact “an uniform Rule of
Naturalization”). Chang acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 382 (1971), had identified the uniformity requirement in the Naturalization Clause as a
possible bar to congressional devolution to the States of its authority to make discriminatory
immigration policy choices. See Graham, 402 U.S. at 382 (stating that a “congressional enactment
construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship
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power to set immigration policy is not founded entirely on the
Naturalization Clause,102 and second, that immigration policy is, and
has been for years, informed by “divergent state laws.”103 He
concluded that established norms of immigration law “leave it to
Congress to decide whether this state role and the discretion it allows
for the adoption of divergent policies serves federal policies
regarding the treatment of aliens.”104 In this regard, Chang reminded
his readers of the Court’s decision in De Canas v. Bica.105 There, the
Court upheld California’s decision to prohibit the employment of
undocumented aliens because the state law was not inconsistent with
federal policy.106 Finally, Chang reasoned, variation among the states
is inevitable with respect to the availability of welfare benefits for
aliens because some states may not provide public benefits for either
aliens or their own citizens and even when they do, the benefit levels
and eligibility criteria will vary.107
Chang completed his attempted deconstruction of the
“nondevolvability principle” by addressing Wishnie’s two policy
arguments: the equality argument and the “race-to-the-bottom”

requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the] explicit
constitutional requirement of uniformity”). Chang dismissed this as dictum. Chang, supra note
91 at 359. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (stating in dictum that “[i]f the
Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards
for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction”)
(emphasis added).
102. It resides also, he argued, in the Constitution’s Foreign Affairs Clauses and the Foreign
Commerce Clause. See Chang, supra note 91, at 360 & n.18.
103. Id. Chang gave as examples the reliance on each state’s definition of marriage to
determine the availability of a visa and the reliance on each state’s choice of which crimes involve
“moral turpitude” and the maximum sentence that may be imposed for a crime, choices that
affect inadmissibility and deportability.
104. Id. at 361.
105. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
106. Id. at 361–62. See discussion in Chang, supra note 91, at 361.
107. Id.
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concern.108 He rejected Wishnie’s argument that devolution will
exacerbate subversion of the Constitution’s “antidiscrimination and
anticaste principles,” even more than Diaz already subverts them, by
permitting the States also to be able to discriminate.109 His response
adopted Spiro’s earlier argument that “were Congress barred from
delegation, it would in most cases opt for uniformity by canceling,
not extending, benefits across the board.”110 Chang’s be-carefulwhat-you-wish-for warning was put this way: “[I]f we insist on
nondevolvability, then we may well get uniform discrimination as a
result. What reason do we have for thinking that a rule of
nondevolvability will lead to uniform access [to public benefits]
rather than uniform exclusion?”111 Nor is a race-to-the-bottom
among the states an inevitable consequence of devolution, in Chang’s
view. A Congress that believed most states would discriminate
against aliens, if so permitted, could, and would, simply legislate that
same discrimination itself if devolution were unconstitutional.112 In
other words, there may be a race-to-the-bottom, but it is not caused
by devolution.113
In short, beginning soon after the 1976 decision in Diaz, and
increasingly since the 1996 enactment of PRWORA, there has been a

108. See discussion supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
109. Chang, supra note 91, at 361.
110. Spiro, supra note 85, at 1638 n.41.
111. Chang, supra note 91, at 363. Chang even suggested, contrary to Wishnie’s concern that
devolution will create “‘laboratories of bigotry against aliens,’” that it may well create “laboratories
of generosity toward immigrants.” Id. at 364.
112. Id. at 364–66.
113. As to Carrasco’s claim that nondelegation should be revived to promote political
accountability by Congress (see Carrasco, supra note 76, at 628), Chang responded that “[t]he
desire to make Congress more politically accountable . . . is quite general” and advocates of
nondevolvability have the burden to demonstrate “why these concerns are especially acute when
Congress authorizes the states to restrict alien access to public benefits [compared to when it
delegates responsibility in other contexts].” Chang, supra note 91, at 368.
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lively debate over the doctrinal and policy implications of devolution.
The participants have been many and have advanced intelligent,
sophisticated, and sometimes compelling arguments built around
divergent views regarding individual rights, the nature of Congress’s
enumerated and non-enumerated powers, and federalism. Missing
in action, however, is any serious evaluation, or even meaningful
recognition, of the separation of powers implications of
devolution.114 The high quality of the debate to date makes that
absence all the more astonishing.115 I show next that issues
concerning the respective authority of Congress and the federal
judiciary to establish the degree of judicial oversight in litigation
involving individual rights have been at the forefront of Supreme
Court litigation over the past decade, that these issues are not likely
to be overlooked when the devolution issue eventually reaches the

114. William Cohen did hint in 1983 that devolution might be understood to raise a
separation of powers issue but dismissed the concern without engaging it. See discussion supra
notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
115. Neither of the two lower court decisions that have litigated the constitutionality of
PRWORA’s delegation to the states of the federal authority to determine benefit eligibility of
aliens has focused on the separation of powers issue that devolution creates. The first case
decided was Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001). It held that abolition of state-funded
medical assistance coverage for legal immigrants was unconstitutional notwithstanding
congressional authority to do so. The court mentioned in passing that separation of powers
precludes Congress from declaring legislatively that a statute satisfies strict scrutiny. Id. at 432.
However, the court’s ruling relied primarily on the conclusion that congressional delegation
violates the uniformity requirement in the Naturalization Clause. Id. at 432–37.
Soskin v. Reinerston, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004), upheld PRWORA’s devolution without
addressing separation of powers issues. The court concluded that “[o]nce Congress has expressed
[a] policy [to give States the discretion to deny welfare benefits to certain legal immigrants], the
courts must be deferential. . . . [this recognizes] that a state’s exercise of discretion can also
effectuate national policy.” Id. at 1255. The court ruled that congressional delegation did not
violate the Naturalization Clause. First, “Congressional power over aliens derives from more than
just the Naturalization Clause. Other sources of Congressional authority include ‘its plenary
authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and . . . the inherent
power of a sovereign to close its borders.’” Id. at 1256 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225
(1982)). Moreover, the uniformity required in the Naturalization Cause was intended to prohibit
states from adopting lenient standards for the naturalization of aliens and then imposing those
more lenient standards on other states. “Here, the choice by one state to grant or deny Medicaid
benefits to an alien does not require another state to follow suit.” Id. at 1257.
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Supreme Court, and that resolution of these separation of powers
issues holds the key to resolving the devolution issue.
V
A SEPARATION OF POWERS CRITIQUE OF THE “DEVOLUTION ISSUE”
Those writing about devolution prior to 1997 might be excused
for failing to focus on the lurking separation of powers issues. For it
was in 1997 that the Supreme Court announced its seminal decision
in City of Boerne v. Flores,116 holding that Congress had exceeded its
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power when it enacted and made
applicable to the states the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA).117 In Boerne, the Court clarified the federal judiciary’s
relationship with the Congress and reasserted the federal judiciary’s
(and particularly the Supreme Court’s) preeminent role in defining
the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.118
To appreciate the relationship between Boerne and devolution, it
is useful to recall that devolution curtails (at least attempts to curtail)
the scrutiny courts give to state alienage discrimination. Two
alternative strategies are deployed: legislative determination that
strict scrutiny is satisfied, and immunizing the states from the
requirements of strict scrutiny by transferring to the states the federal
government’s own immunity from strict scrutiny.119 In either case,
devolution attempts to manipulate the judicial review of

116. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (2000). RFRA also was made applicable to the federal
government, and that application of RFRA is constitutional. See Gonzales v. Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (deciding that RFRA precludes federal
government from enforcing federal controlled substance legislation against small church’s use of
sacramental hallucinogenic tea).
118. See discussion supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
119. See discussion supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory state legislation and thereby reverse the effects of
previous Supreme Court decisions. An attempted manipulation of
judicial review is exactly what Congress attempted when it enacted
RFRA in an unsuccessful effort to reverse the effect of the 1990
Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith.120
For many years prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had held that
facially neutral laws of general application that impose a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion are unconstitutional unless
justified as necessary to advance a compelling state interest.121 In
Smith the Court reversed course, holding that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment does not provide protection from the
incidental burdens on religious expression that may result from the
nondiscriminatory application of facially neutral laws of general
application.122 As the Boerne court recalled, Smith held that “neutral,
generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even
when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”123
RFRA attempted to reverse that outcome by providing that laws that
“substantially burden” the exercise of religion are unlawful unless
they advance a “compelling governmental interest” and are “the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”124 In other words, Congress attempted to override Smith’s

120. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
121. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding denial of claimant’s
unemployment benefits for refusing to work on the Sabbath to be unconstitutional). See also
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513 (concluding that under Sherbert, “we would have asked whether [a state’s]
prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was
justified by a compelling government interest”).
122. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. In Smith, members of the Native American Church presented the
claim that a state law barring the use of peyote violated their religious freedom since for them
peyote was a sacrament.
123. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a), (b).
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neutrality test and require that all laws that substantially burden free
exercise must be subjected to strict scrutiny review.
In Boerne, the Court concluded RFRA was unconstitutional
because it “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers . . . .”125 The Court in Boerne rejected the view
that Congress’s Section 5 power enables it to expand constitutional
rights by defining for itself what the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits and legislating against it.126 In language whose clarity could
not easily have been lost on members of Congress, the Court in
Boerne held that “Congress has [no] power to decree the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”127
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce’ not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”128 Congress’s
power is “corrective or preventive, not definitional . . . .”129 A Court
willing to deploy such robust language is not likely to be willing to
entertain a vision of congressional authority that undercuts, even
indirectly, the federal judiciary’s supremacy to enforce constitutional
limitations.130 What needs to be determined is whether devolution

125. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (holding also that RFRA violated federalism principles).
126. Id. For a defense of the view rejected, see, e.g., Archibald Cox, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966) (stating that
“Congress, in the field of state activities and except as confined by the Bill of Rights, has the power
to enact any law which may be viewed as a measure for correction of any condition which
Congress might believe involves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amendment rights”). See
also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1966) (suggesting that requiring the judiciary
to find a constitutional violation before upholding a Section 5 based congressional enactment
would unnecessarily limit legislative power).
127. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id. at 525.
130. The Court did acknowledge in Boerne that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’s enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional . . . .” Id. at 518. The challenge is
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contravenes the separation of power principles Boerne so ardently
champions.
Certainly, a congressional attempt to legislatively decree that a
state statute satisfies the rigors of strict judicial scrutiny squarely
offends Boerne’s separation of powers foundations. Otherwise,
Congress, not the judiciary, becomes the arbiter of what state
legislation will survive strict judicial review. But what if devolution
were viewed as a scrutiny-shifting mechanism intended to modify
not the application, but rather the standard of judicial review by
transforming from strict scrutiny to rational basis the level of judicial
review given to state alienage discrimination? Would this represent
an effort by Congress to “decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s restrictions on the States”131 or “determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation [for the states]?”132 Since a shift
to rational basis would result in a denial of most equal protection
to devise a method to distinguish when the aim of federal legislation is really to deter
unconstitutional behavior and when it actually is intended to expand the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive sweep. The Court rejected the guidance in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966), that courts should uphold congressional exercise of the Section 5 power if they
could “perceive a basis” upon which to conclude that legislation was aimed at enforcing rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653. Considering itself too
feeble for the task of uncovering Congress’s true aim, the Court rejected what has been
characterized as the “limitless deference” of a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny. See
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After
City of Boerne v. Flores, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 94 (1997). The Court chose instead a heightened
level of judicial scrutiny by adopting the now familiar “congruence and proportionality” test.
Boerne, 421 U.S. at 520 (stating that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a
connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect”). The Court in Boerne
concluded the following:
RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have
any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior.
It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections.
Id. at 532.
131. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
132. Id.
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challenges to state alienage discrimination statutes, a court
reasonably could conclude that, like RFRA, devolution does have the
practical effect of “determin[ing] what constitutes a constitutional
violation [for the states].”133
These
similarities
between
devolution
and
RFRA
notwithstanding, one enormous difference stands out. Devolution,
unlike RFRA, entails Congress authorizing the states to adopt
policies that Congress lawfully could adopt itself. Wishnie called it a
“striking proposition” that Congress constitutionally is precluded
from authorizing the states to undertake action that would be
permissible if done directly by Congress itself.”134 He frames the
question as, “[w]hy is Congress barred from doing indirectly what it
could do directly?”135
One answer might be that Congress is not so barred. Perhaps
devolution does not violate the Boerne principles—because of Diaz.
The argument might be that the Court never surrendered to the
Congress the responsibility to determine the scope of religious liberty
guaranteed in the Constitution. Accordingly, when Congress took it
upon itself in RFRA to make that determination, it intruded upon the
Court’s essential constitutional function to determine the
Constitution’s substantive sweep. But if Diaz is understood as a
virtual surrender to the Congress of the authority to determine the
scope of the Constitution’s equality norm in the context of alienage
classifications, then that distinction from Boerne may settle the

133. Id. To be sure, devolution attempts to expand the powers of the states by limiting the
scope of judicial review, while RFRA attempted to limit the powers of the states by expanding the
scope of judicial review that otherwise would be available. The common denominator of both
RFRA and devolution, however, is a congressional effort to delimit the judiciary’s authority to
find constitutional violations by manipulating the scope of judicial review.
134. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 520.
135. Id. at 521.
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question of whether devolution violates Boerne’s separation of
powers principles. Let me state this another way. If the Court and
the Congress were to develop conceptually different visions of the
equality norm in the Equal Protection Clause in the context of
alienage discrimination, does Diaz require that the Court yield to the
Congress’s vision? If the answer is yes, then Diaz distinguishes
devolution from Boerne because the Court never relinquished its
claimed right to assert its own vision of religious liberty. RFRA
embraced a conceptually different vision of religious liberty from that
held by the Court and that largely explains the outcome in Boerne.136
But, Diaz was not a judicial surrender to the Congress of the
authority to determine the scope of the Constitution’s equality norm
regarding alienage classifications. Even though the Court has
virtually abandoned its scrutiny of congressional or presidential
decisions to discriminate against aliens in federal immigration policy,
it could (and should) cry foul if Congress attempts to inoculate the
states against strict judicial scrutiny and thereby preclude the Court
from exercising its traditional heightened supervision over state
alienage discrimination. As I show next, the reason is that what the
Court surrendered in Diaz was a significant institutional role in
reviewing alienage classifications made by the Congress or the
President. But the Court in Diaz never surrendered to the Congress
its institutional prerogative (and responsibility) to insist upon
acceptance of its own vision of the equality norm found in the Equal
Protection Clause. If those two statements seem incongruous, it is
because of the need to clarify the distinction between the breadth of
state and federal behavior that the Equal Protection Clause’s equality

136. This understanding of Boerne, accurate in my view, was first expressed by Eisengruber
and Sager. See Eisengruber and Sager, supra note 130, at 97–105.
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norms in fact proscribe and the proscriptions that the Court, limited
by institutional constraints, will enforce.
Lawrence Sager’s straightforward, yet stunning, article, published
nearly thirty years ago,137 explains this distinction. Sager makes the
point that we have become acculturated to the view that the scope of
constitutional limits on the behavior of state or federal officials
extends only as far the judiciary is willing to enforce those limits.138
Sager persuasively argues against that view. He shows that many
constitutional norms, particularly the equality norms found in the
Equal Protection Clause, are “underenforced” by the federal courts
due largely to self-imposed restraints arising out of institutional
considerations.139 These institutional concerns may relate to “the
competence of federal courts to prescribe workable standards of . . .
conduct and devise measures to enforce them.”140 Or, “the claims for
restraint [may] turn on the propriety of unelected federal judges
displacing the judgments of elected [governmental] officials. . . .”141
In other words, there is a “‘slippage’ between a constitutional norm

137. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
138. Id. at 1213 (stating that “[m]odern convention treats the legal scope of a constitutional
norm as inevitably coterminous with the scope of its federal judicial enforcement”).
139. Id. (arguing that the Supreme Court, “because of institutional concerns, has failed to
enforce . . . the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries”).
140. Id. at 1217. Sager cites San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
41–44 (1973) (explaining that the Court ought to exercise restraint in imposing “inflexible
constitutional restraints” due to concerns related to the judiciary’s competence to formulate
taxation schemes, its lack of “expertise and . . . familiarity with local problems,” and the
complexities of school finance and management.). Regarding this language in Rodriguez, Sager
concludes that “[w]hatever view one takes of these concerns, it is difficult to understand them as
speaking even indirectly to the scope or content of the concept of equal protection; rather, they
are claims which address the question of [the] limits the federal judiciary should [self-impose] in
interpreting and enforcing that concept.” Sager, supra note 137, at 1218.
141. Id. at 1217; see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (reiterating the importance
of maintaining the “proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”).
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and its enforcement.”142 Sager reminds us that the doctrine of
judicial restraint, and the rule of “clear mistake” eloquently
articulated during the Nineteenth Century by James Bradley Thayer,
are “not founded on the idea that only manifestly abusive legislative
enactments are unconstitutional, but rather on the idea that only
such manifest error entitles a court to displace the prior
constitutional ruling of the enacting legislature.”143 Sager argues that
the Court’s reluctance to decide the merits of a constitutional dispute
because it raises a political question proves most eloquently that a
“distinction between the scope of the norms of the Constitution and
the scope of their judicial enforcement is inherent in the doctrine of
judicial restraint . . . .”144 Yet, outside the political question doctrine,
“when institutional concerns [also] lead . . . to limited federal
enforcement of the constitutional norm in question, we treat the
absence of judicial intervention as an authoritative statement about
the norm itself.”145 Sager urges that we rethink conventional wisdom
regarding what it means for the Court to rule on a case and accept
the following:

142. Sager, supra note 137, at 1213.
143. Id. at 1223 (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)).
144. Id. at 1224; see id. at 1226 (arguing that “[w]hen institutional concerns result in the
invocation of the political question doctrine, we understand the constitutional norm at issue to
retain its legal validity”). One might add that Sager’s thesis is apparent in the standing doctrine.
A court might decide that no one has standing to challenge a blatantly unconstitutional law, based
on judicially self-imposed institutional restraints (prudential concerns). Yet, that refusal to
provide a judicial remedy says nothing about the constitutionality of the challenged statute. That
question simply is left to other authoritative decision makers. See United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (stating that “[i]t can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to
litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual
or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed
to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process”); see also Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (concluding that “[o]ur system of
government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes”).
145. Sager, supra note 137, at 1226.
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[When a constitutional limitation] is found not to extend to
certain official behavior because of institutional concerns rather
than analytical perceptions, . . . the resulting decision [should not
be viewed] as a statement about the meaning of the constitutional
norm in question. After all, what the members of the federal
tribunal have actually determined is that there are good reasons
for stopping short of exhausting the content of the constitutional
concept with which they are dealing . . . .”146

Sager’s insight that a governmental official’s compliance with a
judicial determination should not lead to the conclusion that the
challenged official behavior is fully compatible with the
constitutional provision147 illuminates why the Court’s decision in
Diaz does not make Boerne inapposite for resolving the devolution
issue. Let us return to Michael Perry’s protestation, discussed above,
that “[i]f it is unjust for a state to treat a person as inferior on the
basis of a morally irrelevant trait [such as alienage], there is no
conceivable basis for concluding that it is any less unjust for the
federal government to do the same.”148 Perry used this argument to
urge a reversal of Diaz. But the argument fails because the holding in
Diaz is not inconsistent with Perry’s observation. That is the whole
point of Sager’s insight. Yes, “it is unjust for a state to treat a person
as inferior on the basis of a morally irrelevant trait [such as alienage]”
and yes one reasonably could determine that “there is no
conceivable basis for concluding that it is any less unjust for the
federal government to do the same”149—at least in most cases. But
the Supreme Court in Diaz never said it was “any less unjust” for the
federal government to burden a class of persons based on “a morally
irrelevant trait” such as alienage. The Court in Diaz never addressed

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1221.
See id. at 1226.
Perry, supra note 69, at 1062.
Id.
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the merits of the argument that federal alienage discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause’s equality norm.150 All the Court
held in Diaz was that judicial review of federal laws discriminating
against aliens employs a different level of judicial scrutiny than
similar state laws because “the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”151
As it noted in Wong, the Court thus accepts, without deciding, that
“there may be overriding national interests which justify selective
federal [alienage discrimination] that would be unacceptable for an
individual State.”152 Because “such decisions are frequently of a
character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive
than to the Judiciary[,] . . . [t]he reasons that preclude judicial review
of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigration and naturalization.”153
In other words, Diaz does not exonerate federal officials from
their obligation to comply with the full breadth of the Equal
Protection Clause’s equality norms as the Court defines those norms.
Diaz does not hold that federal alienage discrimination is any less
invidious, or less “unjust” as Perry puts it, than identical state
alienage discrimination.
Accordingly, if particular federal
discrimination against aliens in fact violates the Constitution’s

150. Note that in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976), Justice Stevens, who
also authored the Diaz opinion, begins his legal analysis with the simple observation that “[t]he
federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially.” Id. at 100. This states the norm but
neither the Wong nor the Diaz opinion apply its full contours to the facts by deciding whether
federal alienage discrimination in employment, or otherwise, violates that norm.
151. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
152. Wong, 426 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).
153. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
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equality norms, but because of institutional considerations no
judicial tribunal is prepared to acknowledge the violation,
congressional authorization for the states to engage in identical
discrimination cannot cure the constitutional defect. The judiciary in
Diaz simply did not surrender its institutional prerogative (and
responsibility) to insist upon acceptance of its own vision of the
equality norm found in the Equal Protection Clause. It only
surrendered, for institutional reasons, a right to insist on enforcing
that vision in the context of immigration rules “made by the
Congress or the President”154 that discriminate against aliens.
Accordingly, the issue devolution presents to the judiciary is whether
the institutional restraints that keep a federal court from adjudicating
the Constitution’s equality norm to its full extent in cases challenging
an express congressional mandate to discriminate should operate
equally to disqualify a federal court from enforcing the equality norm
to the full extent of its conceptional boundaries when state officials’
congressionally-authorized behavior is at issue. This is a normative
question for the judiciary, not the Congress, to answer.
Thus the issue is framed: Is there any evidence that the Court
would (should) hold that the institutional restraints that explain the
outcome in Diaz are inapplicable to restrain the Court when
presented with challenges to state alienage discrimination that
Congress has authorized? The answer is yes, there is evidence that
those restraints are inapplicable. Devolution does not transfer to the
states the federal government’s claim, recognized in Diaz, of a
deferential standard of judicial review—at least in most cases. That
evidence is found in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,155 decided the same

154. Id.
155. 426 U.S. at 88.
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day as Diaz. Specifically, that evidence is found in Wong’s
differential-deference principle.156
It will be recalled,157 that in Wong the Court was presented with a
case involving congressional devolution of its authority to
discriminate against aliens. There Congress and the President
devolved to a federal agency, the Civil Service Commission, authority
to set immigration policy regarding federal employment. In Wong,
plaintiffs successfully challenged the Civil Service Commission rule
making citizenship a condition for eligibility for most federal
employment. The Civil Service Commission, not the President or
the Congress, had promulgated the citizenship regulation.158 Neither
Congress nor the President ever required the rule or ever gave
explicit approval or disapproval to it.159 The Court did conclude that
“both the Legislature and the President have been aware of the policy
and have acquiesced in it.”160 Nevertheless, the Court held that such
acquiescence does not warrant judicial deference to the Civil Service
Commission’s judgment that the rule was intended to advance
overriding federal interests. The primary reason was because the rule
was not the result of the “considered judgment” of either the
President or the Congress.161 As the Court had already stated in Diaz,
“[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also

156. See discussion supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
157. See discussion supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text.
158. Wong, 426 U.S. at 91–93, 105.
159. Id. at 109–10.
160. Id. at 106. The Court also found that Congress never repudiated, or gave considered
judgment to repudiating, the Commission policy. Id. at 108.
161. Id at 107. The Court explained that “[i]n order to decide whether . . . acquiescence
should give the Commission rule the same support as an express statutory or Presidential
command, it is appropriate to review the extent to which the policy has been given consideration
by Congress or the President and the nature of the authority specifically delegated to the
Commission. Id. at 105.
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dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and
naturalization.”162
In Wong, the President had promulgated an Executive Order
devolving to the Commission the discretion “to establish standards
with respect to citizenship,”163 but the Court held that this “is not
necessarily a command to require citizenship as a general condition
of eligibility for federal employment.”164 Most significantly for
resolution of the “devolution issue,” the Court held that even
assuming this Executive Order were susceptible of a reading “which
might permit the Commission to decide that citizenship should be
required for all federal positions, it would remain true that the
decision to impose the requirement was made by the Commission
rather than the President.”165 Indeed, the Commission was delegated
so much discretion that it could retain, modify, or repeal the
citizenship requirement “without further authorization from
Congress or the President.”166 This level of discretion delegated to the
Commission by the Congress and the President disqualifies the
Commission’s rule from any claim that the Court, applying a
deferential standard of judicial review, should uphold the rule merely
because it could find that the rule might advance some plausible
legitimate governmental interest.
Instead, where the decision to discriminate is not made by the
Congress or the President, a heightened standard of judicial review is
required. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
Wong, 426 U.S. at 111–12.
Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 113.
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the Court to find a “legitimate basis” for concluding that the interests
asserted in support of alienage discrimination are genuine (that they
were “consciously adopted”167 as the “actual predicate for the rule”
rather than just being plausible) and that they advance an
“overriding” federal interest.168 This “legitimate basis” due process
requires cannot be grounded on the rule-promulgating actions of a
delegee of the Congress or the President unless that policypromulgating delegee is one having “direct responsibility for
fostering or protecting [the allegedly overriding] interest [that] was
the actual predicate for the rule.”169 In Wong, the Court held it had no
“legitimate basis” to conclude either that the represented reason for
the citizenship requirement is genuine—that the represented reason
for the requirement was “consciously adopted”170 and was in fact the
“actual predicate for the rule”—or that this asserted justification for
the citizenship requirement constitutes an “overriding” federal
interest.171 Neither the Congress nor the President had mandated the
rule and the Civil Service Commission had no responsibility related
to the interests advanced in support of the citizenship requirement.172

167. Id. at 113 n.46 (concluding that “in view of the consequences of the [citizenship] rule it
would be appropriate to require a much more explicit directive from either the Congress or the
President before accepting the conclusion that the political branches of Government . . .
consciously adopt[ed] a policy raising the constitutional question presented by this rule”).
168. Id. at 103.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 113 n.46.
171. Id. at 103.
172. The Court pointed out that the Commission has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for
treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for
naturalization policies. “Indeed, it is not even within the responsibility of the Commission to be
concerned with the economic consequences of permitting or prohibiting participation by aliens in
employment opportunities in different parts of the national market.” Id. at 114.
The Court did conclude that the Commission had responsibility for one of the justifications of
the citizenship requirement—“the administrative desirability of having one simple rule excluding
all noncitizens when it is manifest that citizenship is an appropriate and legitimate requirement
for some important and sensitive positions.” Id. at 115. This interest was found insufficient to
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Wong’s holding compellingly supports the conclusion that
congressional legislation acquiescing in state alienage discrimination
does not transfer to the states a Diaz-type scope of deferential judicial
review.173 As Wong makes plain, “it would be appropriate to require
[an] explicit directive from either the Congress or the President
before accepting the conclusion that the political branches of
Government . . . consciously adopt[ed] a policy raising the
constitutional question presented by [the challenged] rule.”174 The
devolution discussed in this essay can never meet that standard. The
devolution we have been discussing does not entail Congress or the
President communicating “a[n] explicit directive” to the states.
Congress’s devolution to the states to set immigration policy is
strikingly similar to the devolution in Wong where Congress and the
President acquiesce in the exercise of discretion provided for in
federal law but never mandate the challenged discriminatory
policy.175 Such acquiescence will not support judicial deference. That
is Wong’s point. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
normally precludes judicial deference to federal alienage
discrimination when Congress or the President merely acquiesce in

support judicial deference to the Commission’s citizenship rule in Wong because there was
nothing in the record “to indicate that the Commission actually made any considered judgment
of the relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value of the service
of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other.” Id. Without such a “considered
evaluation,” the Court concluded, the administrative convenience justification may be nothing
more than a “hypothetical justification”—hardly sufficient to justify the “wholesale deprivation of
employment opportunities caused by the Commission’s indiscriminate policy.” Id. at 115–16.
173. Wong entailed devolution to a federal agency, while the devolution we are discussing
delegates congressional policy-making authority to the states. That difference does not disable
Wong from serving as precedent in cases involving devolution to the states. See discussion infra
notes 174–181 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 114 n.46.
175. See discussion supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
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the discriminatory rule rather than “impose” it.176 The only policy
“consciously adopted” by Congress when enacting the devolution
legislation we have been considering is the policy to defer to a state’s
exercise of discretion. That is a federalism-based decision to forego
any preemption claim should a state choose to exercise the discretion
federal law provides. That policy judgment is not the “policy raising
the constitutional question presented by [the challenged] rule.”177
Congress’s decision to devolve some of its powers to the states and
provide the states a defense against a preemption challenge may be
the essential condition for the equal protection constitutional
controversy to arise. But the fact remains that the rule that
precipitates an equal protection challenge is one that the state
promulgated, just as in Wong it was the rule of the Commission that
precipitated the challenge.178 The key point is that the challenged
rule is not the result of any mandate from either the Congress or the
President.Of course, Wong also states that, in limited circumstances,
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits the judiciary to
defer to representations of the overriding need to discriminate that
are advanced by an agent of the Congress or the President.179 In such
cases, the judiciary may presume that the “political branches of
Government . . . consciously adopted [a] policy” advancing an
overriding national interest, but only when the policy-promulgating
entity is one having “direct responsibility for fostering or protecting

176. Id. at 112. (concluding that “even though . . . an interpretation [of federal law] might
permit the Commission to decide that citizenship should be required for all federal positions, it
would remain true that the decision to impose the requirement was made by the Commission
rather than the President”) (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 114 n.46.
178. Compare discussion supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text with discussion supra
notes 157–166 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text.
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[the] interest [that] was the actual predicate for the rule.”180 In the
devolution cases arising under PRWORA, that policy-promulgating
entity is a state or local government, but these entities have no “direct
responsibility for fostering or protecting” the interests PRWORA
seeks to advance: promoting immigrant self-sufficiency “a basic
principle of United States immigration law,” and discouraging
immigration motivated by a desire to avail the immigrant of public
benefits.181 Like the Civil Service Commission, the states have no
responsibility for foreign affairs,182 for treaty negotiations, for
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for
naturalization policies.183
Accordingly, Wong’s reasoning supports the conclusion that a
state’s discriminatory welfare eligibility policies that are permitted,
but not required, by PRWORA do not qualify for a deferential
rational basis level of judicial review.184
180. Id. at 103.
181. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1)–(2).
182. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding “intrusion by the State into the
field of foreign affairs [unconstitutional because] the Constitution entrusts [regulation of foreign
affairs] to the President and Congress”).
183. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“[T]he power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). Indeed the predicate for the field preemption of
state law with respect to regulating immigration arises from the exclusivity of federal power to
regulate immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971)
(state alienage classifications “encroach[ing] upon federal power” preempted).
184. The Court’s decision in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) does
not require a contrary result. There, the issue presented was whether partial assumption of
criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian lands by the State of Washington constituted a violation
of equal protection and, specifically, what standard of judicial review was appropriate to decide
that question. In Yakima, the Court acknowledged that “[i]t is settled that ‘the unique legal status
of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling
out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive [because] States
do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians.” Id. at 500–01 (quoting Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974)). Nevertheless, because “Washington was legislating under
explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise of . . . federal [plenary] power [over Indian
tribes],” the Court evaluated the equal protection challenge to Washington’s legislation by the
same rational basis standard it would apply had the federal government itself promulgated the
challenged rule.
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There are two final points about Wong and PRWORA. First, in
PRWORA Congress made a legislative finding that the goals of
PRWORA, encouraging immigrant self-sufficiency and discouraging
immigration to the United States that is motivated by the
immigrant’s desire to obtain public benefits,185 are “compelling
government interest[s].”186 Wong contained no similar legislative or
presidential findings regarding the importance of limiting federal
employment to citizens.
This raises the question whether
PRWORA’s legislative finding distinguishes PRWORA from Wong
and provides the Court the requisite “legitimate basis” to defer to
state alienage discrimination authorized by PRWORA. In other
words, what if we were to hypothesize that in Wong the President or
Yakima is not inconsistent with Wong’s differential-deference principle. It does not support
the proposition that Congress may shift the standard of review of state alienage discrimination
from strict scrutiny to rational basis by legislatively authorizing states to engage in alienage
discrimination. What makes state alienage discrimination “constitutionally offensive” and subject
to strict judicial scrutiny is that aliens are a “discrete and insular minority” warranting “unique
protection from the majoritarian political process.” See discussion supra notes 8–11 and
accompanying text. Alienage classifications, moreover, are the equivalent of racial classifications.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). By contrast, in Yakima, the Court
concluded that classifications based on tribal status are not invidious and are not directed at a
discrete and insular minority, making it “untenable” to “argu[e] that . . . classifications [based on
tribal status] are ‘suspect’ . . . .” Id. at 501. This is well-established. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553
n.24 (explaining that tribal status classifications are not racial classifications; they are “not
directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians.' . . . [They are] political rather than racial
in nature.”). The non-invidious nature of tribal status classifications distinguishes Yakima from
Wong. What renders state classifications based on tribal status “constitutionally offensive” is not
the invidiousness of such classifications (the classifications simply are not invidious) but rather
the State’s lack of any “unique relationship with Indians.” Yakima, 439 U.S. at 500. The
significance of this distinction was made plain in Mancari where the Court explained that “[a]s
long as the special treatment [of Indians] can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.” Mancari,
417 U.S. at 554. Without congressional authorization, states can never meet that standard since
states do not share “Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.” All Yakima holds is
Congress may choose to share that unique obligation with the states and, when it does, the
rational basis level of judicial review transfers. Nothing in Yakima remotely suggests that
Congress may insulate the states from a judicial determination that state alienage discrimination
is invidious and unconstitutional unless justified as necessary to advance a compelling state
interest.
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1)–(2).
186. See id. § 1601(5)–(6).
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the Congress had made a finding that a rule encouraging legal aliens
to become naturalized citizens would advance a compelling
governmental interest? Would that require a different outcome in
Wong if the Civil Service Commission had represented that it had
promulgated the citizenship requirement to encourage legal
immigrants to become citizens? The answer is no, and, again,
viewing Wong through the lens of separation of powers illuminates
the reason. A congressional or presidential finding that some
interest is compelling or overriding would give the court assurance
that, if it deferred, the represented basis for the discriminatory rule
would constitute a weighty governmental interest (because Congress
had so decided). Yet, there remains the second concern that
animated the Court’s inability to defer to the Commission in Wong—
that there also must be a “legitimate basis” to conclude that the
represented reason was “consciously adopted”187 and was in fact the
“actual predicate for the rule.”188 Nothing in Congress identifying
some interest as compelling, either in Wong or in PRWORA,
provides any assurance to the Court that the legislatively identified
overriding interest was in fact the “actual predicate for the rule” that
raises the constitutional challenge. What gives the Court that
assurance is that the rule was mandated by either the Congress or the
President. In both the Wong hypothetical and in PRWORA, that
remains the missing piece.
Finally, could states acquire a rational basis standard of judicial
review for their congressionally-authorize alienage discrimination if

187. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 113 n.46 (1976) (concluding that “in light of
the consequences of the [citizenship] rule it would be appropriate to require a much more explicit
directive from either the Congress or the President before accepting the conclusion that the
political branches of Government . . . consciously adopt[ed] a policy raising the constitutional
question presented by this rule”).
188. Id. at 103.
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a court were to determine that another congressional goal of
PRWORA, or some other federal devolution statute, is to permit each
state the option to preserve its resources for its own citizens? The
answer is no, as a close reading of Wong shows. The federal district
court in Wong had accepted the Civil Service Commission’s
justification for the citizenship rule in that case on the ground that
“the Executive may intend that the economic security of its citizens
be served by the reservation of competitive civil service positions to
them, rather than to aliens.”189 After the district court had decided
Wong, but before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court
decided Sugarman v. Dougal.190 In its Sugarman decision, the Court
rejected New York’s argument that “its special interest in the
advancement of profit of its own citizens could justify confinement
of the State’s civil service to citizens of the United States.”191 What
New York meant by this rejected argument was that the state should
be able to “‘restrict[ ] the resources of the state to the advancement
and profit of the [citizens] of the state.’”192 In rejecting this
justification, the Court in Sugarman explained that “[a] resident alien
may reside lawfully in [the state] for a long period of time. He must
pay taxes. And he is subject to service in this country’s Armed Forces.
The [special public interest] doctrine, rooted as it is in . . . the
desirability of confining the use of public resources [to those who
have contributed], has no applicability in this case.”193 In Wong,
Justice Stevens discussed Sugarman and its rejection of the “special
public interest” defense and opined that “our discussion of the

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 94.
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
Id. at 643–45.
Id. at 643–44 (quoting People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429, aff'd, 239 U.S. 195, 36 (1915)).
Id. at 645.
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‘special public interest’ doctrine in [Sugarman] no doubt explains the
petitioner’s failure to press this argument in this case [and thus] [w]e
have no occasion . . . to decide when, if ever, that doctrine might
justify federal legislation.”194
This sidebar discussion in Wong of the Court’s previous rejection
of the “special pubic interest” justification for alienage discrimination
could prove very instructive in devolution cases should future federal
legislation seek to justify devolution based on the interest of
permitting each state the option to preserve its resources for its own
citizens. Sugarman rejected this as being even a legitimate state
interest, at least with respect to state discrimination against
permanent resident aliens who contribute to American society.195
Therefore even though this is an interest for which the states have a
direct responsibility for fostering and protecting, it may not be used
to justify a transformation of the standard of judicial review from
strict scrutiny to rational basis.196

194. Wong, 426 U.S. at 95, 104 n.24.
195. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 645 (holding that because permanent resident aliens “must pay
taxes [and are] subject to service in this country's Armed Forces, [the special public interest]
doctrine, rooted as it is in . . . the desirability of confining the use of public resources [to those
who have contributed] has no applicability”).
196. Nor, by extension, can Congress effect a scrutiny shift by stating that the goal of
devolution legislation is permitting each state to maintain the fiscal integrity of its public benefit
programs and declaring that this is a compelling interest. This is nothing but a repackaging of the
state’s interest, rejected in Sugarman, of restricting state resources for the advancement and profit
of state citizens. See Memorial Hosp. V. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263–68 (1974) (holding
that maintaining fiscal integrity of a public-benefit program is not a compelling state interest);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (“The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an
otherwise invidious classification.”); see also Ehrlich v. Perez, 2006 WL 2882834, at *18 (Md.
2006) (holding that a constitutional challenge to a PRWORA-authorized state policy to deny
benefits to lawful permanent resident aliens is likely to succeed and concluding that “preserving
the fiscal integrity of a state benefit program” is insufficient justification for such discrimination).
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VI
WRAPPING UP SOME LOOSE ENDS: A CASE FOR KEEPING WONG
To recapitulate, the argument advanced in this essay reduces to
the application of four straightforward propositions. First, in
devolution legislation Congress does not, because it cannot,
authorize the states to violate the Constitution.197 Second, nor can
Congress bind the judiciary through legislative decrees that the
prerequisites of strict judicial scrutiny are satisfied when states
discriminate in ways federal devolution legislation authorizes. The
separation of powers underpinnings of City of Boerne v. Flores198
preclude such congressional dominance of the judicial function.199
Third, the devolution issue, accordingly, is best understood as a
separation of powers based normative question reserved for judicial
branch determination: Should the judiciary exercise Diaz-type
judicial restraint in constitutional controversies involving
congressionally authorized, but not mandated, state policies that
discriminate against aliens when Congress could have enacted those
policies itself?200 Fourth, Wong’s due process-based differentialdeference principle resolves the devolution issue by requiring that
there be proper grounds for judicial deference of discriminatory
policies, or as the Court puts it in Wong, a “legitimate basis for
presuming that the [discriminatory] rule was actually intended to
serve [an overriding national] interest.”201 Such a “legitimate basis”
normally exists only when the decision to discriminate is mandated

197. See discussion supra notes 42, 98–99 and accompanying text.
198. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
199. See discussion supra notes 116–130.
200. See discussion supra notes 131–154 and accompanying text.
201. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). See discussion supra notes 155–
181 and accompanying text.
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either by Congress or the President.202 Devolution legislation that
permits states to adopt discriminatory immigration policies that
Congress is permitted to adopt itself does not qualify for deference
under Wong’s differential-deference principle because a state
governor or legislature, not Congress or the President, has mandated
the challenged discriminatory policy.203
Before proceeding, it also may be beneficial to emphasize two
things the above argument does not entail. First, nothing I have
argued above depends on a resolution of the debate as to whether
Congress may or may not delegate to the states a portion of its
authority to set immigration policy.204 Wong simply teaches that
assuming arguendo that Congress possesses devolution authority,
and chooses to exercise it by granting states some discretion to set
immigration policy, the resulting state legislation most likely will be
subject to the strict judicial scrutiny normally accorded state alienage
classifications.205 Second, it is important to distinguish Wong’s

202. The sole exception is the unusual case where a delegee of Congress or the President has
“direct responsibility for fostering or protecting [the overriding national] interest, . . . [that] was
the actual predicate for the [federally-authorized and state-promulgated discriminatory
immigration] rule.” Id. See discussion supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
203. See discussion supra note 181 and accompanying text.
204. Compare Wishnie, supra note 4, at 494 (“[T]he federal power to regulate immigration, a
power not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but universally recognized for over a
century, is among those that are exclusively national and incapable of devolution to the states.”)
and Carrasco, supra note 76, at 631–38 (arguing that the Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 power “to
establish an uniform rule for naturalization” precludes congressional delegation of discretion to
the states to frame immigration policy because, by definition, United States immigration policy
no longer would be “uniform”) with Chang, supra note 91, at 360 & n.18 (arguing that federal
power to set immigration policy may be delegated to the states because first, it is not founded
entirely on the Naturalization Clause and second, that immigration policy is, and has been for
years, informed by “divergent state laws”). Focusing on Wong clarifies that the devolution issue is
not whether federal immigration power may be delegated to the states but rather whether with
that delegation Congress may transfer to the states the federal government’s immunization from
strict judicial scrutiny.
205. If the resulting state legislation discriminates based on alienage, the normal rule is that
the courts will apply a heightened judicial scrutiny to evaluate the legislation’s constitutionality.
See discussion supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. Of course, if the resulting state
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separation of powers grounded and due process based differentialdeference principle from cases denying governmental entities’ power
to act because federal legislation never authorized the challenged
action in the first place.206 In Wong, the Court assumed that the Civil
Service Commission possessed authority to promulgate the
challenged citizenship rule.207 The rule was not struck down for lack
of the Commission’s authority to promulgate it, but rather because
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precluded judicial
deference because neither the President nor the Congress had
mandated it.208 In short, understanding Wong through the lens of
separation of powers principles clarifies that the critical question in
Wong is not whether an “agent of the National Government” seeking
deference has been authorized by Congress to act but whether the
agent devolution legislation delegates is an appropriate agent, that is,
one whose judgments provide the Court a “legitimate basis” to defer.

legislation is even-handed to both aliens and citizens, then no heightened judicial scrutiny is
warranted and Wong’s due process principle is not implicated. See discussion infra note 228.
206. See, e.g., Cmty. Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983) (holding that the
Federal Rehabilitation Act creates no special obligation for the FCC to evaluate a public television
station’s service to the disabled community since the FCC is not a funding agency and has no
responsibility for enforcing the Rehabilitation Act); NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n., 425 U.S.
662, 669–70 (1976) (holding that the Federal Power Act delegated to the Federal Power
Commission authority to consider evidence and make inquiries to determine whether a regulatee
had incurred unnecessary costs because of racially discriminatory employment practices, but use
of the words “public interest” in Act is not a broad license for the agency to promote the general
public welfare by eradicating employment discrimination).
207. The Commission’s delegated authority was so broad that the Commission possessed
authority to retain, modify, or repeal the citizenship requirement “without further authorization
from Congress or the President.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 113 (1976).
208. Moreover, deference to the Commission’s judgment that the rule was needed to advance
a compelling federal interest was not warranted because the Commission lacked the direct
responsibility for fostering and protecting the interests the Commission advanced to justify the
rule. See discussion supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text; Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism,
Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 817 (1983) (explaining that the Court
did not invalidate the regulation in Wong because the Commission had exceeded its delegated
authority, and concluding that otherwise Wong “would be an ordinary case in administrative law,
a case about an agency that exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority”).
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The final point of inquiry needed to close this essay is assaying
the continued viability of the Court’s holding in Wong. One might
ask whether Wong’s thirty-year old, 5-4 reading of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause limitation on judicial deference is
sensible, and should continue, when applied to Twenty-First Century
federal authority to promulgate immigration policy. That is to say,
should we keep Wong, knowing that most congressionallyauthorized state alienage discrimination will be found
unconstitutional,209 with the consequence that the courts will remand
to Congress or the President to determine the immigration policy
question that federal devolution legislation had authorized the states
to decide?
On what grounds might one even think to question the
continuing viability of the holding in Wong? Is it Wong’s pedigree?
Wong came to us somewhat circuitously. It and Diaz had been
argued on January 13, 1975, but both cases were held over and
reargued the next term.210 Justice Douglas had suffered a debilitating
stroke in Nassau, Bahamas on New Year’s Eve, 1974 which left him
“physically and mentally disabled.”211 He did not return to the Court
to hear oral arguments until March 24, 1975 and, on April 10th,
returned to Walter Reed Hospital.212 He was in and out of the
hospital in the Spring of 1975 and was a patient at the Rusk Institute

209. Courts will conclude that congressionally-authorized state alienage discrimination is
unlawful because Wong’s reasoning precludes the federal government’s rational basis level of
judicial review from transferring to the states, and the state discriminatory policies cannot meet
the rigors of strict judicial scrutiny. See cases discussed supra notes 48, 50–53 (holding state
alienage discrimination unconstitutional when strict judicial scrutiny is applied).
210. See Wong, 426 U.S. at 88; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 67 (1976) (captions showing that
these cases were argued on January 13, 1975 and reargued on January 12, 1976).
211. Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, THE BRETHREN at 357, 367 (1979).
212. Id. at 361–62, 364, 367, 384–85.
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in New York City as the 1974 Term closed.213 Because the Justices
increasingly feared that Justice Douglas was mentally incapacitated,
and because they wanted to avoid a blitz of reversals should President
Ford appoint a conservative to fill a vacancy that Justice Douglas’s
death or resignation would create, a consensus developed among the
Justices that all 5-4 cases in which Justice Douglas was in the majority
“would be treated as if they were 4-to-4 ties, and they would be put
over for reargument the next term.”214 Justice Douglas resigned from
the Court in November, 1975. Justice Stevens was confirmed as his
replacement in December, 1975, and “[o]n Steven’s first day on the
bench for oral argument [January 12, 1976], the Court heard . . .
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong . . . .”215 “The conference split 4-to-4 [in
Wong], along the same lines as it had the previous term [leaving] it
up to Stevens”216 who wrote the majority decision.217 Five members
of the Court comprised the majority in Wong but there was not a
majority on the Court who agreed entirely with Justice Stevens’ view
of the case.218
However uncertain one might consider Wong’s inception, its core
principle that the federal judiciary will not defer to just any agent of
the national government was not novel and has been reaffirmed.

213. Id. at 402.
214. Id. at 367.
215. Id. at 402.
216. Id. On the other hand, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), was unanimous.
217. Justice Stevens was also assigned to write the decision in Diaz.
218. Justice Stevens believed that the Civil Service Commission could not constitutionally
promulgate the rule barring aliens from federal employment but the President or the Congress
could. There was not a majority on the Court who agreed with him. This is evidenced by the fact
that Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens’s opinion in Wong but Justice Brennan
filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, emphasizing his understanding that the
Court had “reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or
[p]residential enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government.”
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 117 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Prior to Wong, in Greene v. McElroy,219 the Court had adopted a rule
quite similar to that developed more fully in Wong. In McElroy, the
Defense Department had withdrawn a security clearance by adopting
procedures that did not conform to traditional notions of due
process.220 The Court refused to defer to the agency’s argument that
the procedures employed were needed to preserve national security.
The Court held the following:
before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security
clearance cases, a person may be deprived of the right to follow
his chosen profession without full hearings where accusers may
be confronted, it must be made clear that the President or
Congress, within their respective constitutional powers,
specifically has decided that the imposed procedures are
necessary and warranted and has authorized their use.221

Since Wong, the Court has continued to insist that justifications
requiring overriding governmental interests be advanced by an
appropriate governmental entity—Congress or the President. Justice
Powell’s decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke222
is, perhaps, the best known subsequent reliance on Wong. Justice
Powell cited Wong in support in his majority opinion when arguing
that race-conscious preferential classifications would be upheld to
remedy past discrimination when the finding of such past
discrimination had been made, for example, by “particular
administrative bodies [that] have been charged with monitoring
various activities in order to detect such violations and formulate
appropriate remedies.”223 Citing Wong again, Justice Powell’s Bakke

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

360 U.S. 474 (1959).
Id. at 507.
Id.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 302 n.41.
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decision rejected the affirmative action plan of the State Regents, in
part, because the Regents, rather than the legislature, had adopted it.
As Justice Powell explained, the Regents lacked the “capability” to
make the necessary findings and adopt the policy: doing so is not
their “broad mission” and the Regents had not been “mandate[d]” to
do so by the state legislature.224
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,225 a plurality of the Court upheld a raceconscious contract-set-aside program in part because Congress had
mandated it. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, again relied on
Wong’s due-process-based differential-deference principle for
determining whether judicial deference is warranted, this time
finding deference appropriate because Congress had determined the
need for the set-aside program to ameliorate the disabling effects of
identified discrimination. Citing Wong, Justice Powell stated that
“the legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy is not
compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has found
that [past discrimination] has occurred.”226
These cases confirm that Wong’s principle is not a one-time ticket
“good for this day and train only.”227 They show the principle predated Wong and extends to state-initiated, as well as federallyinitiated, discrimination. Nor is the principle limited only to
discriminatory immigration policy. Wong is solidly grounded
constitutional law.
Its differential-deference principle applies

224. Id. at 309 (finding that the Board of Regents was in “no position to make [the requisite]
findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the
adjudication of particular claims of illegality [, and] isolated segments of our vast governmental
structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative
mandates and legislatively determined criteria”).
225. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
226. Id. at 498 (Powell J., concurring) (emphasis added).
227. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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whenever unique circumstances call upon the Court, for institutional
reasons, to depart from heightened judicial scrutiny and defer to the
judgments made by other decision-makers that there exists a
compelling need to discriminate and the challenged legislation in fact
was enacted to promote that compelling need.228
But imagine for a moment that there were no Wong. Why, if at
all, would we want a constitutional law principle holding that when a
rule depends for its constitutional justification upon an “overriding
national interest,” due process requires that there be a “legitimate
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that
[overriding] interest?”229 Similarly, why, if at all, would we want a
rule, such as that argued by Justice Powell in Fullilove, that the Court
will not find a “legitimate basis” to presume that an asserted interest
is genuine and compelling, unless the governmental entity making
the assertion possesses “appropriate governmental authority.”230 In
short, can a case be made for Wong independent of the fact that its

228. Three years after Wong the Court decided New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979), another majority opinion written by Justice Stevens. Beazer shows that Wong’s
due process-based principle limiting judicial review applies only to equal protection cases
involving credible claims of impermissible bias against a special class (suspect classifications). In
Beazer, the Court upheld a general rule barring employment of those using narcotic drugs,
including methadone, reasoning that the prohibition was a rule of general application and did not
single out methadone users for special discrimination. Id. at 588. Rational basis review thus was
the normal judicial scrutiny given to such legislation. Accordingly, the dissent, citing Wong,
achieved no traction arguing that the challenged rule should be struck down because “it was not
the result of a reasoned policy decision” and the Transit Authority was not “directly accountable
to the public” and “not the type of official body that normally makes legislative judgments of fact
such as those relied upon by the majority today, and [petitioners] are by nature more concerned
with business efficiency than with other public policies for which they have no direct
responsibility.” Id. at 609 n.15 (White, J., dissenting). These things may be true but they are
inapposite outside the context of discrimination normally warranting strict judicial scrutiny.
229. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976).
230. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498.
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due process-based limitation on judicial deference has been part of
our constitutional fabric for over thirty years?231
Initially, it is worth noting that the result in Wong makes sense on
its facts. It is sensible for the judiciary to interpret the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause to permit judicial deference to a
discriminatory immigration rule only when the rule is mandated by
the heads of the co-equal branches of the federal government—the
Congress and the President. After all, the reason the Court is
deferring in the first place is that immigration policy is beyond the
competence of courts to scrutinize because it involves a political
question232 involving foreign affairs.233 Given this rationale for
deferring, it makes no sense for the Court to defer to a federal agency

231. Of course, as with any Supreme Court majority opinion, Wong has the claim of stare
decisis, a claim that I do not mean to discount. Stare decisis is an important influence in
constitutional law. The restraint it imposes on the Court enhances the public perception of the
Court’s integrity, and concomitantly, its authority. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66
(1986) (reasoning that stare decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact”); Lewis F.
Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990) (stating that
“the elimination of constitutional stare decisis would represent an explicit endorsement of the
idea that the Constitution is nothing more than what five Justices say it is [, thus] undermin[ing]
the rule of law”). Reliance on precedent gives judicial decisions predictability. It provides neutral
principles around which to render decisions. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961) (stating that
“[a] principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved”). Also, adherence to stare decisis helps reduce the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” of
judicial review by requiring explicit justifications for departures from precedent, thus “allaying
suspicion that the Justices base their decisions upon personal preferences.” Note, Constitutional
Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1350 (1990).
232. See Wong, 426 U.S. at 101–02 n.21 (concluding that “the power over aliens is of a
political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review”).
233. See discussion supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962) (explaining that “[n]ot only does resolution of [foreign relations] issues frequently
turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views”); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative . . . Departments”).
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whose broad responsibilities are unrelated to the formation and
execution of foreign affairs or immigration policy.234 By extension, it
makes no sense to expect the Court to defer when a state legislature
or a governor, for example, adopts an immigration policy that
discriminates against aliens, even if such a policy is permitted by
federal law. For here also, the Court lacks any legitimate basis to
presume that the “actual predicate” for the rule is the interest
asserted as justifying the legislation or to presume that a state
government has the requisite institutional competence (certainly
none that exceeds the Court’s own) to provide the Court assurance
that the asserted predicate for the rule constitutes an “overriding”
governmental interest.

234. Discussing Wong, Lawrence Sager has explained that the Court was presented there with
two justifications for the Commission’s policy of alien exclusion: The policy provided the
President a “token” for foreign affairs bargaining, and it encouraged legal immigrants to become
citizens. Lawrence G. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enter., Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1417 (1978). Sager explains his rationale:
These interests can be viewed as beyond accurate judicial assessment for two reasons.
First, consideration of their importance involves technical judgments informed by a
range of material to which the judiciary does not have full access; and second, the
interests, though potentially quite weighty, are discretionary in the sense that they
depend for their importance on prior decisions of policy or strategy made by the
President or Congress. These factors combine to result in a judiciary largely dependent
upon the judgment of either the President or Congress as to whether there are
‘overriding national interests’ which justify the exclusion policy; thus, when the
judiciary is confronted with the enactment of such an exclusion by either of these two
entities, it will defer broadly to the judgment thus manifested.
In contrast, when a body—like the Civil Service Commission in Mow Sun Wong—
which lacks the information, expertise, and discretion as to policy and strategy enacts
such a rule, [if] the courts . . . sustain the enactment, thus endorsing a transgression of
constitutional principles [, they do so] without any assurance that it is justified by
weighty national interests . . . .
Id. Surely the same can be said of judgments made by state governors and legislatures. These
entities also “lack[] the information, expertise, and discretion as to policy and strategy [needed for
the Court to have] assurance that [the policy] is justified by weighty national interests.” Id. The
appropriate course in each case is the one the Court chose in Wong: “in effect . . . remand to the
decision-making body able to make appropriate policy judgments for an initial assessment of the
validity of the enactment.” Id.
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Not only does Wong’s differential-deference principle make
logical and practical sense, it also promotes important constitutional
values. When it is applied to preclude states from claiming a rational
basis standard of judicial review for evaluating the constitutionality
of congressionally-authorized state alienage discrimination, Wong’s
principle has two primary effects: 1) states normally are banned from
adopting the challenged discriminatory policy and 2) the courts
remand to the Congress or the President the policy question states
are precluded from deciding. Each of these consequences is salutary.
First, adhering to strict judicial scrutiny of state alienage
discrimination, even when congressionally authorized (in effect
banning most of that discrimination), advances the
“antidiscrimination and anticaste principles that are at the heart of
our Constitution and that long have protected noncitizens at the
subfederal level,” as Wishnie has argued.235 The default in our
constitutional system, after all, is equality for all persons lawfully in
this Country.236 Discrimination is the aberrant condition justified
only by overriding governmental exigencies.237 Wong serves to

235. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 553. Wishnie posits that the Constitution bans all delegation of
federal immigration authority as a means of protecting this “antidiscrimination and anticaste
principle.” See discussion supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. My argument assumes for
sake of argument that this is incorrect, that the federal government may devolve to the states
authority to set immigration policy but if the immigration policies states thereby adopt
discriminate against aliens, the discrimination will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, not
rational basis review. See discussion supra notes 156–181 and accompanying text.
236. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy that all
persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all
citizens under non-discriminatory laws.”).
237. It is a mistake to read Diaz and Wong as holding that anything less than an overriding
national interest can justify state or federal alienage discrimination. It is true that Diaz requires
only that federal officials demonstrate a rational basis to advance some legitimate governmental
interest when federal alienage discrimination is challenged. That does not mean, however, that
the federal government may rely on anything less than an overriding national interest to satisfy
the Constitution’s equality norms. See discussion supra notes 137–154 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the distinction between what the Constitution requires and what a court, given its
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preserve the vitality of this equality principle. Without Wong and its
effect of barring states from claiming a rational basis level of judicial
review of congressionally-authorized alienage discrimination, courts
would be required to defer not just to the political judgments of the
Congress and the President that alienage discrimination is necessary,
but also would need to defer to those same judgments made by state
governors and legislatures. Soon Diaz’s narrow exception from the
default of equality could overwhelm the equality norm as more
devolution legislation swelled the demand for judicial deference to
state alienage discrimination. In that scenario, it is not difficult to
imagine alienage discrimination becoming the default and equality
the exception.
With a proliferation of judicially-permitted state alienage
discrimination authorized by federal law, some state officials easily
could acquire a taste for alienage discrimination. Public sentiment
could become accustomed to it—indeed approve of it and desire it.
Then Congress inevitably would be under increased pressure to
devolve to the states increased authority to adopt discriminatory
immigration policies. Courts should not indulge themselves in
thinking they would be held harmless if judicial deferral to
congressionally-authorized state alienage discrimination became
widespread. In a system of “rule of law” there is no justification for
permitting unlawfulness where a court is institutionally competent to
redress the violation. The citizenry may accept that courts lack the
institutional capability to scrutinize strictly congressional or

institutional restraints, will enforce. Wong erases any doubt that the federal government may not
discriminate against aliens absent an overriding national interest. Recall that in Wong the Court
states that “[w]hen the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification
for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State,
due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually
intended to serve that [overriding] interest.” Wong, 426 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
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presidential judgments regarding immigration policy. As Diaz
concludes, these judgments are essentially political since they are so
entwined with policies related to foreign affairs.238 But courts do
possess the institutional competence to continue to hold states to a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny when they adopt policies that
discriminate against aliens. Courts have been exercising that
competence for over half a century.239 Plus, the logic of Wong is
straightforward and compelling: entities such as the Civil Service
Commission (and, by extension, the states) lack the institutional
capacity to provide sufficient assurance to the Court (and to us) that
their discriminatory policies in fact are predicated upon the
advancement of overriding governmental interests. Given the logic
of Wong and the long history of courts strictly scrutinizing state
alienage discrimination, courts would be hard-pressed to explain
why, now, they lack the institutional competence to continue to
protect the Constitution’s equality norm simply because Congress
has chosen to acquiesce in the alienage discrimination which states
legislate.240

238. See discussion supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
239. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 410 and discussion supra notes 48, 51–53 and accompanying
text.
240. Nor should it be any consolation that courts may be saved from public contempt by the
rising acceptance of alienage discrimination that the absence of judicial involvement will bring.
Law conditions values, and permitting the states to discriminate against aliens inevitably will send
the signal that such discrimination is consistent with the Constitution’s equality norms. Lawrence
Sager reminds us that “our tendency . . . [is] to equate the existence of a constitutional norm with
the possibility of its enforcement against an offending official.” Lawrence Sager, supra note 137,
at 1221. A failure to apply strict judicial scrutiny of congressionally-authorized state alienage
discrimination is particularly worrisome when one considers Professor H.L.A. Hart’s observation
that one of the essential conditions for the existence of a legal system is that the legal system’s
rules of behavior must be “accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its
officials.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961). Not only will the incidence of
alienage discrimination rise with the easing of judicial scrutiny of official alienage discrimination,
but one can expect some skewing of official and public views in the direction of accepting that this
discrimination is consonant with the Constitution’s equality norms.
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Not only does Wong promise benefits that flow from a
continuation of the ban on state alienage discrimination, but benefits
accrue also from the remand back to the political branches of the
federal government to take a more studied, and perhaps more
sensitive, look at “policy judgments that threaten important
constitutional values.”241 This includes those judgments animating
governmental policies that discriminate against aliens. Dan Coenen’s
exhaustive study makes a convincing case that Wong represents
merely one of a myriad of “process-centered rules” the Court has
developed over the years to encourage “the policymaker’s use of
quality-enhancing processes and structures . . . [designed to]
safeguard[] substantive constitutional values . . . .”242 What is gained
by rules, which “pay[] attention to the decisionmaker rather than to
the decision,”243 is the promise of greater engagement by politically
responsible rule-promulgating officials and more deliberation and
care in crafting rules that implicate sensitive constitutional values.
Plus, a rule such as Wong’s differential-deference rule helps maintain
a “proper—and properly limited role—of the courts in a democratic
society,”244 because Congress always has the final say: following
remand, Congress may reinstate any state-enacted discrimination
against aliens that the Court has rejected, assuming there is a rational
basis for Congress’s action. Wong, in short invites a “collaboration”
between the courts and Congress in the elaboration of policies that

241. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1582 (2001).
242. Id. at 1583.
243. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 816.
244. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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discriminate against aliens in the hope that this will improve the
quality of resulting policies.245
Dan Coenen calls Wong-type rules “proper-decision-maker
rules.”246 They evaluate the “differing capacities of different
government decision makers[,] . . . tak[e] account of [their] structural
strengths or weaknesses . . . [and] channel important decisions from
one set of political-branch policymakers to another . . . .”247 For
example, the Wong case itself might properly be understood as a
judgment by the Court that the President, to whom the challenged
rule in that case was remanded, will be more reflective, will more
likely add a measure of care, deliberation, and considered judgment
to the policymaking process, or will more likely provide a systematic,
and thoughtful, treatment of the subject.248 One plausibly can predict
that these same benefits will flow should Wong be applied to bar
devolution to the states of Congress’s authority to adopt
discriminatory policies harming aliens.249
245. See Coenen, supra note 242, at 1589 (suggesting that viewing elaboration of
constitutional values as a shared process between the judicial and nonjudicial authorities assumes
that constitutional rights are not fixed and unbending but rather “operate as embodiments of
enduring values that the Court must balance against competing interests said to justify what the
government has done”); see also Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2781, 2795 (2003) (pointing out that one advantage of a “provisional review” technique such
as that employed in Wong is that it “allows the courts to bring to the legislature's attention
constitutional values that it may have overlooked or given less value than the courts think it
should have”).
246. Coenen, supra note 242, at 1773.
247. Id. at 1775–76.
248. See id. at 1727–29; see also Sager, supra note 137, at 1414 (elaborating the point that
Wong postulates a view of due process requiring “that some legislative actions be undertaken only
by a governmental entity which is so structured and so charged as to make possible a reflective
determination that the action contemplated is fair, reasonable, and not at odds with specific
prohibitions in the Constitution”).
249. Or, courts may wish to take the congressionally-authorized immigration policymaking
function away from state or local governments because they “lack . . . interest, information, or
expertise [and are] unlikely to act rationally, and hence are not competent lawmakers.” Jonathan
C. Carlson & Alan D. Smith, Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 155, 230 (1978).
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Cass Sunstein has focused more on the “democracy-forcing”
function served by Wong250 than on its potential to enhance the
quality of resulting decisions. He argues that Wong’s differentialdeference principle “was expressly founded on the idea that publicly
accountable bodies should make the contested decision that was
challenged in the case.”251 The reasoning in Bakke252 and Fullilove253
support that view. They show how Wong can serve the important
function of channeling policymaking to “broadly representative and
politically accountable officials who operate in conditions of high
visibility.”254
The gains from this are enhanced political
accountability and protection from interest group influence by
moving decisions away from faction-dominated state entities to a
presumably more temperate congressional legislative process.255

250. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48 (1996).
251. Id; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000)
(concluding that Wong is one of the Constitution’s “nondelegation canons [that] represent a
salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed to ensure that certain choices are made
by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree . . . [and that] protect[s] individual rights,
and other important interests . . . [by requiring that i]n certain cases, Congress must decide the
key questions on its own”).
252. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
253. See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
254. Coenen, supra note 242, at 1778–79.
255. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 522 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), advanced a convincing argument that “[a] sound
distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests . . . upon social reality
and governmental theory.” Justice Scalia’s reasoning applies equally to alienage discrimination.
Justice Scalia argued that Congress possesses an institutional competence to legislate
discriminatory outcomes that is not possessed by state and local governments. He thought it
problematic, even at the national level, that Congress would act with the dispassion and
objectivity needed to legislate in a race-conscious way with “‘the single objective of eliminating
the effects of past or present discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
527 (1980) (Stewart, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joined, dissenting)). But at the local level, this
dispassion “is substantially less likely to exist [because invidious discrimination] has historically
been a struggle by the national society against oppression in the individual States.” Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia reasoned as follows:
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Moreover, moving the policymaking forum from the local to the
national level decreases the likelihood that discriminatory
immigration policies will reflect parochial views that opt for shortterm benefits for state citizens and concomitant burdens for noncitizens who are unrepresented in the legislature.256 Plus, the
discriminatory policies harming aliens that do emerge have the

What the record shows, . . . is that racial discrimination against any group finds a more
ready expression at the state and local than at the federal level. To the children of the
Founding Fathers, this should come as no surprise. An acute awareness of the
heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large,
political units dates to the very beginning of our national history. See G. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, pp. 499-506 (1969). As James Madison
observed in support of the proposed Constitution's enhancement of national powers:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plan of oppression. Extend the sphere
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.
The Federalist No. 10, pp. 82–84 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring). The greater potential for discrimination at the state and local
levels of government argues strongly for the result in Wong, which conditions judicial deference
on clear directions from either Congress or the President mandating a discriminatory rule.
256. Gerald Neuman has advanced several reasons why state and local governments, as
opposed to federal, have a greater propensity to oppress aliens. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as
Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1436–37 (1995). These include the socio-economic reality that immigrants
are not evenly distributed throughout the United States, resulting in “localized anti-alien
movements” and “racial or ethnic conflict.” Id. at 1436. Moreover, state and local alienage
classifications easily can hide ethnic animosity given the “susceptibility of alienage labels to
provide a code in which ethnically specific appeals can be couched.” Id. at 1452. Neuman argues
that, by contrast, “[l]ocal anti-foreign movements may have difficulty enlisting the national
government in their crusades, in part because emotions are not running so high . . . and in part
because aliens have some virtual representation in Washington by means of the foreign affairs
establishment, which knows that the United States will have to answer in the international
community for actions taken at home.” Id. at 1436–37. Finally, Neuman argues that “[t]he
constitutional division of authority between the state and federal governments puts aliens at risk”
from state, but not federal, discrimination because “States lack control over the entry of aliens,
and this sometimes leads them to channel their frustration and resentment about unwelcome
federal policies into hostility toward the aliens who are admitted.” Id. at 1437.
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imprimatur of approval from highly visible, broad-based democratic
institutions, deploying deliberative legislative techniques. This adds
legitimacy and greater public acceptance to the eventual policy
position that emerges. The judiciary benefits also from a more
reflective, deliberative lawmaking process. The remand to Congress
or the President to make the immigration policy choice provides the
judiciary a measure of assurance that its deference will be limited to
more nuanced immigration policies that protect overriding national
interests while not unduly damaging the Constitution’s equality
norms. With such assurance, courts can be expected to be more
willing to defer to the judgments of the political branches of the
federal government, a result that comports with “the basic
constitutional commitment to democratic self-government.”257
If keeping Wong provides even some of the benefits potentially
available from continuing the ban on state alienage discrimination
and remanding the policy choices to a deliberative democratic
process at the national level, and if keeping Wong results in
encouraging greater dialogue and reflection, we can expect a net
increase in the moderation we exhibit to legal immigrants as we
collectively struggle to accommodate the competing legitimate
interests that arise in crafting an intelligent immigration policy. That
alone makes a strong case for keeping Wong.

257. Coenen, supra note 242, at 1843.
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